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ABSTRACT
ON IMPROVING ROBUSTNESS OF HARDWARE




B.E., VISVESVARAYA TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Sandip Kundu
The continued growth of information technology (IT) industry and prolifera-
tion of interconnected devices has aggravated the problem of ensuring security and
necessitated the need for novel, robust solutions. Physically unclonable functions
(PUFs) have emerged as promising secure hardware primitives that can utilize the
disorder introduced during manufacturing process to generate unique keys. They can
be utilized as lightweight roots-of-trust for use in authentication and key generation
systems. Unlike insecure non-volatile memory (NVM) based key storage systems,
PUFs provide an advantage – no party, including the manufacturer, should be able to
replicate the physical disorder and thus, effectively clone the PUF. However, certain
practical problems impeded the widespread deployment of PUFs. This dissertation
addresses such problems of (i) reliability and (ii) unclonability. Also, obfuscation
techniques have proven necessary to protect intellectual property in the presence of
vi
an untrusted supply chain and are needed to aid against counterfeiting. This disser-
tation explores techniques utilizing layout and logic-aware obfuscation. Collectively,
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Worldwide spending on Information Technology (IT) has been projected to reach
$3.76 trillion in 2019, according to the latest forecast by Gartner, Inc [37]. De-
spite saturation in certain markets such as mobile devices or PCs, IT spending is
set to further increase due to growth in younger sectors like cloud services, neural
networking applications and, most of all, Internet of Things (IoT). The ubiquitous-
ness of large, interconnected digital ecosystems, in critical areas such as banking or
healthcare, presents an ever-growing attack surface for malicious entities to exploit.
The complexity of the supply chain for the production and deployment of IT infras-
tructure also presents a security problem. Potential breaches in security can prove
very costly in terms of loss of privacy, safety and revenue. Hence, developing robust
solutions to ensure security of information being stored or exchanged, ability to iden-
tify/authenticate users or devices numbering in the millions and intellectual property
(IP) protection in an untrusted supply chain has become vital.
1.1 Physically Unclonable Functions
Secure authentication and identification is crucial for many interconnected sys-
tems with, potentially, millions of users or edge devices. Often, a system’s security
goals have to be serviced using the deployed hardware and hence, integrating roots-
of-trust into the design becomes essential. For example, resource-constrained systems
like Smartcards or RFID tags can implement lightweight authentication via locally
stored secret digital keys. However, such traditional non-volatile memory (NVM)
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based storage of secret keys is susceptible to various forms of attacks when an at-
tacker is able to gain physical access to the device. Side-channel attacks using power
measurements, fault injection via overclocking or even invasive attacks such as de-
capsulation, de-layering and probing can be utilized to access the stored secret keys
[21, 47]. An alternative to NVM-based secret key storage are physically unclonable
functions (PUFs), which can generate secret keys when desired instead of storing
them. In principle, PUFs leverage the physical disorder, say introduced during the
complex manufacturing process for integrated circuits (ICs), and translate it into
unique binary outputs. It is assumed that no one, including the PUF manufacturer,
will be able to replicate the exact disorder of a PUF system and that any invasive
attack will upset the disorder to render the PUF unusable.
Extensive research has explored construction of PUFs by exploiting various sources
of physical disorder such as Optical PUF [93], coating PUF [121], phosphor PUF [63],
RF COA [38] and LC-PUF [51]. Silicon transistor-based PUFs were first introduced
by Gassend et al.[47]. Since then, a large number of silicon based PUFs like Arbiter
PUF [75] and SRAM PUF [55] have been proposed.
Definition: A PUF P implements a unique mapping function f(c) that maps
any m-bit input challenge c ∈ {0, 1}m to an n-bit output response r ∈ {0, 1}n. The
tuple (c, r) is termed as a challenge-response pair (CRP).
Depending on the number of unique CRPs that a PUF system is able to generate,
we can classify PUFs into Weak or Strong PUFs.
1.1.1 Weak PUFs
PUFs which can produce only a limited set of unique CRPs are classified as Weak
PUFs. This limitation requires that the generated responses be secret as an attacker
can clone the PUF easily if the CRPs are exposed. Weak PUFs are primarily useful
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Figure 1.1: A six transistor SRAM cell
for generation of secret keys and can replace NVM-based key storage due to the
previously mentioned security against invasive attacks.
The most widely studied Weak PUFs are SRAM PUFs [50, 55, 57] which utilize
SRAMs in embedded memories. An SRAM cell typically consists of two cross coupled
inverters whose outputs are connected to the bitlines via access transistors. Figure 1.1
shows a typical 6-transistor SRAM cell. Due to intrinsic process variations, the
power-up state of an SRAM cell can randomly settle into either a logic-0 or logic-1
value. The state is determined by mismatch due to the process variations in the cell
transistors from the manufacturing process. Settlement to consistent, yet random
states allows processing multiple cells’ outputs to be used as a key or identifier. Post-
manufacturing, the Weak PUF key is recorded during the enrollment phase and this
key becomes the reference once the device is deployed in the field.
Ideally, an SRAM PUF will produce the same key each and every time it is queried.
However, noise can impact the SRAM state during start up and thus, make the PUF
unreliable. Specifically, cells with low process variation induced mismatch between
the cross-coupled inverters are highly sensitive to noise and their outputs can flip
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from the correct value. Cells with greater mismatch produce sufficient differential
drive to overcome any impact from noise. The sources of noise can be variations
in environmental conditions, supply voltage changes and parametric changes due to
aging of the transistors. Since Weak PUF outputs have to be reliable for use as secret
keys, error correction techniques are critical for ensuring proper operation.
1.1.2 Strong PUFs
Strong PUFs, in contrast to Weak PUFs, are capable of producing an extremely
large number of CRPs due to the more complex mapping between the challenges and
responses. The large set of unique CRPs makes Strong PUFs a good candidate for
authentication applications as an attacker, ideally, cannot clone the PUF by inter-
cepting a few CRPs. Further, the authenticator need not repeat the same challenge
between successful authentication events, preventing a replay attack using previously
recorded CRPs. Also, the authentication is more resilient in the presence of unreliable
responses as more responses can be queried and a threshold operation used to decide
the outcome of the event. Ideally, the Strong PUF response from a previously unseen
challenge cannot be predicted by an attacker. In practice, research has shown that
utilizing machine learning (ML) algorithms on a limited set of CRPs, it is possible to
build a prediction model which can simulate the PUF and output responses [107]. If
the prediction accuracy is sufficiently high, the software model has successfully cloned
the Strong PUF and can authenticate itself as the legitimate PUF with a large prob-
ability of success. This breaks the ‘unclonability’ property of a PUF. Hence, ensuring
low learning accuracy is important for a Strong PUF.
One of the earliest Strong PUFs proposed was the Arbiter PUF [75], as shown in
Figure 1.2. It consists of multiple delay elements in each stage, challenge inputs to
select the signal path and an Arbiter at the end that outputs a 0/1. When a challenge
is applied, two unique paths are chosen by the challenge bits at the switches of each
4
Figure 1.2: Arbiter PUF
stage and a common signal is allowed to race through these paths to the final Arbiter.
The Arbiter resolves the response to logic-0 or logic-1 depending on which signal
arrives first. An exponential number of path pairs can be created based on the input
challenge and hence, produce an exponential number of unique challenge-to-response
mappings are possible. As each delay element is affected by process variation, the
same challenge can produce different outputs across different instances of the PUF.
It should be noted that the final delay of the signals that arrive at the Arbiter is a
linear sum of individual stage delays. Hence, machine learning techniques were able to
model the Arbiter PUF with high accuracy [107]. A more complex challenge-response
mapping is needed to protect against modeling attacks.
1.1.3 Quintessential PUF Properties
Irrespective of the PUF classification, PUF circuits are expected to exhibit certain
salient features in terms of uniqueness, reliability and unpredictability. Along with
these PUF related metrics, other standard circuit metrics such as area, power and
speed should also be satisfied.
1.1.3.1 Uniqueness
Each PUF implementation has to exhibit a high degree of uniqueness across var-
ious PUF instances and across various challenges to the same PUF. Failure to do
so can adversely affect the ability to identify a PUF uniquely among a large num-
ber of instances. Low uniqueness can stem from systematic bias and from the PUF
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circuit’s inability to harness the process variations effectively. However in practice,
ensuring high uniqueness can incur a high yield loss for a manufacturer as bias in the
manufacturing process cannot be completely eliminated.
1.1.3.2 Reliability
The circuit characteristics of a PUF can be affected by sources of noise such as
environmental variations. This can result in erroneous responses to the same chal-
lenge across different queries. The reliability of a PUF response in the presence of
noise is critical for Weak PUFs. In Strong PUFs, susceptibility to noise increases the
number of responses needed to successfully authenticate a device and the authentica-
tion threshold will have to be less than 100%. Further, the accuracy requirements for
machine learning algorithms is reduced for a more unreliable Strong PUF, adversely
impacting the security of the PUF.
1.1.3.3 Unpredictability
Unpredictability or unclonability is the most important requirements for PUFs.
In Weak PUFs, the generated key should not be exposed to unauthorized parties. In
Strong PUFs, the security of the PUF is dependent on the complexity of modeling
the challenge-response mapping using learning algorithms. If the mapping is easy to
model, a software clone can be created to act as a rogue PUF, indistinguishable from
the authentic PUF.
1.2 Hardware Obfuscation
Increasing costs for manufacturing has led to rise of fabless companies that design
Integrated Circuits (ICs) and outsource manufacturing to foundries. Typically, for an
IC, there is a non-recurrent design cost, incurred by the designer, and manufacturing
cost, for as long as the IC is in production. The manufacturing cost is kept manageable
as the foundry manufactures multiple designs from different intellectual property (IP)
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owners for improved efficiency. Also, many products can contain multiple IPs from
different vendors on the same die.
This fabless structure of the industry has led to an increased risk of IP theft as the
designer has to reveal the complete design to a foundry for manufacturing. Another
source of concern is that to further reduce costs the foundries are located in countries
with inexpensive labor but, with ambiguous IP protection laws. Hence, this creates
a situation for malicious actors to steal the IP, cutting down on design costs, and
produce counterfeits for profit. Also, rival companies may attempt to learn about
proprietary designs to gain advantage in the market. This leads to a significant loss
of revenue for the designer. Current assessments estimate this loss to be to the tune of
$4 billion annually [10]. There is also an increased security risk as the attackers may
corrupt the original design for their own purposes before sale. Such a harmful black-
market product can severely damage the reputation of the design company leading
to further losses.
To protect their revenue stream and their products from tampering, fabless com-
panies have proposed many solutions for increased security. On the manufacturing
side, fabless companies and government agencies like Intelligence Advanced Research
Projects Agency (IARPA) [13] have proposed using split manufacturing to secure
against attacks. The design layout is split into Front End Of Line (FEOL) and Back
End Of Line (BEOL) layers. FEOL layers are fabricated by foundries with advanced
feature capabilities. The wafers are shipped to a trusted foundry where BEOL layers
are fabricated. The trusted foundry costs less to build and maintain. Hence, it can be
in-house or shared among a group of fabless companies. Many other solutions have
been proposed like hardware metering[106], watermarking or tamper-proofing. One
area of IP security research that has received much attention is hardware obfuscation.
The goal of obfuscation is to hide the true functionality of a design. Obfuscation
techniques have been proposed at various levels of design abstraction and can vary
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from introduction of additional gates to lock a circuit [106] to system level techniques
[31]. Obfuscation can also involve the creation of camouflaged cells [33, 101] whose
function can be hard to determine.
1.3 Scope of this Work
In this dissertation, we seek to explore improved PUF designs with particular
focus on reliability of Weak PUFs and on unpredictability for Strong PUFs. We
also explore hardware obfuscation techniques to aid in the prevention of theft of
intellectual property.
In particular, our contributions include:
 Designed alternatives to simple SRAM PUFs that exhibit greater reliability in
the presence of thermal noise. This results in significant savings in terms of
error correction circuitry required to create the final robust keys.
 Proposed an intelligent accelerated aging methodology to further aid in increas-
ing reliability of Weak PUFs while reducing the aging time overhead.
 Leveraged Weightless Neural Network (WNN) architecture and Weak PUFs to
create a Strong PUF. Multiple variants were created and analyzed to realize
a Strong PUF that exhibits a high resilience to machine learning attack while
maintaining high uniqueness and reliability.
 Identified various avenues for visual information leakage from a physical IC
layout and proposed techniques to obfuscate visual circuit information.
 Leveraged advantageous, intrinsic properties of FinFETs to create camouflaged
cells capable of implementing multiple logic functions without change in cell
layout and being resistant to reverse engineering.
8
1.4 Dissertation Outline
The dissertation is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, we discuss the SRAM
circuit alternatives for increased reliability. In Chapter 3, an efficient accelerated
aging methodology for increasing the reliability of multiple Weak PUF designs is
explored. Chapter 4 illustrates various Strong PUF architectures based on Weightless
Neural Networks and Weak PUFs and analyzes the proposed variants against PUF
metrics. Chapter 5 describes a Strong PUF system built on reliable Weak PUFs
as an entropy source and linear-feedback shift register (LFSR) based mechanism to
provide a large set of robust keys. In Chapter 6, we explore protection against design
reverse-engineering using visual information in physical layouts. Chapter 7 explores
the utilization of multiple threshold FinFETs to create lightweight camouflaged cells.
Finally, chapter 8 provides a conclusion for this dissertation work
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CHAPTER 2
IMPROVING RELIABILITY OF WEAK PUFS VIA
CIRCUIT TECHNIQUES
2.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Section 1.1, in practical applications, PUF characteristics are
influenced by environmental factors and aging. The PUF outputs are susceptible to
noise and hence, the reliability of a PUF cell must be addressed. As the principal
use of Weak PUFs is in key generation/identification, post-processing is typically
employed to create extremely reliable keys from PUF outputs. A host of techniques
have been proposed, ranging from temporal majority voting [85] to fuzzy extraction
and error correction schemes [80, 81]. These techniques come with significant costs
in terms of additional circuitry like counters (majority voting), or require decoding
blocks and a large number of initial Weak PUF cells to produce a stable 128-bit
key (fuzzy extractors). These strategies for handling errors are often layered atop
standard SRAM cell designs to generate reliable keys, but the basic SRAM cell error
rate is treated as a given and unchangeable.
In this chapter, we explore alternative cross-coupled designs that can provide a
greater sensitivity to intrinsic process variations and thereby, enhance the mismatch
between the coupled elements. Enhancing the imbalance makes the design less sus-
ceptible to noise. We highlight the significant savings that can be achieved for ECC
implementations on account of modifying the Weak PUF cells to be more reliable. We
study circuit thermal noise as the main error mechanism as it can affect the circuit
in a differential manner, causing an error in the outputs. We present results on the
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reliability impacts of environmental factors such as supply voltage and temperature
variations, and we show the advantages of using our designs.
2.2 Background
In this section, we discuss previous research into improving the reliability of keys
generated by SRAM-based Weak PUFs that involve algorithmic and circuit-based
error correction mechanisms.
2.2.1 Fuzzy Extraction and Error-Correction Codes
Fuzzy extraction was initially proposed to derive stable keys from biometric data
and also, to authenticate such data [40]. Application of error-correction codes (ECCs)
and fuzzy extractors to correct errors in SRAM PUFs involves the generation and use
of helper data [28,39,80,81,83], which is made public. While the helper data aids in the
recovery of a key from original data in the presence of noise, a stable key of specified
length requires the use of a long starting string [28]. As a technology node matures,
process mismatch reduces and this increases the intrinsic error of any SRAM PUF
implemented in the mature technology node. Hence, the overhead of a longer initial
string and larger amount of helper data for fuzzy extraction and error correction to
compensate the high error rate becomes increasingly expensive in mature technologies.
Thus, reducing the inherent error rate of SRAM cells can accrue significant area and
computation savings by reducing reliance on costly error-correction.
2.2.2 Circuit and Fabrication Techniques
Alternatives to ECC involve the pursuit of circuit and device-level technology
solutions that either improve the SRAM cell reliability or implement more efficient
error detection and compensation schemes. Hofer et al.proposed pre-selecting SRAM
cells that possess a greater degree of mismatch in the cell transistor threshold volt-
ages [54]. However, this approach also involved the need for expensive Non-Volatile
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Random-Access Memory (NVRAM). Bhargava et al.have proposed technique to im-
prove reliability through Hot carrier injection (HCI) aging [26]. Similarly, effect of
aging on PUF reliability has been explored by Garg et al.[46] and Maes et al.[82].
Jang and Ghosh [61] proposed an 8T SRAM PUF with PMOS latch and a low-power
7T SRAM cell with embedded Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) to enhance the re-
liability of the PUF in the presence of environmental fluctuations. Su et al. [116]
proposed the use of SRAM-like cells with a common centroid layout and resettable
logic to reduce the influence of systematic process variations.
The use of temporal majority voting (TMV), burn-in and dark bits evaluation
for the purpose of reducing error rates was showcased by Mathew et al.[85]. De-
sign changes were required to enable voting and synchronous design helped improve
uniqueness. However, the approach can only correct error rates of < 8 % and addi-
tional techniques are necessary for practical applications. Adapting voltage ramp-up
time to ambient temperature to reduce the error rate of memory PUFs has been pro-
posed by Cortez et al.[36]. The drawbacks are that the auxiliary circuits needed for
voltage ramp-up can be area intensive and shaping supply voltage is expensive for
designs with large power delivery network.
Ganta and Nazhandali explore alternate configurations of the inverters in the
SRAM cell to improve the stability of SRAM cells with respect to variations in tem-
perature and reduce the number of unreliable bits to save on ECC area [45]. Our goal
is to study the PUF cell performance at a given temperature in the presence of thermal
noise that can cause errors in its output. We seek to explore alternative configurations
of the PUF cell that increase process sensitivity and hence, provide greater mismatch
between the cross-coupled elements. Bucci and Luzzi [30] presented a differential
circuit that captures the process mismatch and amplifies it to reduce the effect of
noise. Once the difference has been sufficiently amplified, the differential outputs are
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latched to generate stable bits. Our work seeks to create simpler differential circuit
design alternatives that can also immunize the cells to noise.
2.3 Weak PUF Design
In this section, the process variation and noise modeling parameters utilized for
this work are detailed. Next, we discuss a simple SRAM-like cell design consisting of
two-cross coupled inverters and then, explore alternatives that have a greater process
variation sensitivity.
2.3.1 Modeling Process Variation
We model manufacturing induced process variations as random parametric varia-
tions in threshold voltage (V TH) and channel length of each transistor in a circuit.
Also, the parameters are random across PUF instances. The values are obtained from
a normal distribution, N(µ, σ2), where the mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) are
determined based on the technology node used. The geometry of a transistor decides
the susceptibility of a device to process variations with larger devices experiencing
lesser fluctuations. In terms of threshold voltage, the mean is the default transistor






where (Wmin,Lmin) are the minimum possible width and length of a device, respec-
tively, and (W ,L) are the sizes used in the design. σV TH0 is the standard deviation
of threshold voltage for the minimum sized device.
In this work, we instantiate the PUF cell designs with 45 nm NCSU FreePDK45
models [6]. Typically, for 45 nm node, a standard deviation of 53 mV for threshold
voltage and 10 % channel length variation are considered [4]. However, one of our
goals is to analyze PUF performance for low process variation corner where cells
13
have high error rates, providing a significant challenge for PUF design. The low
variation scenario is also of great practical importance as it is representative of mature
technology nodes which exhibit low manufacturing process variations. Hence, to
obtain the amplified mean error rate for each design, only the threshold voltage for
each transistor is varied with the base value provided by transistor models as the
mean and the standard deviation of a minimum sized device set to 5 mV (chosen by
us). Equation (2.1) is then used to calculate the standard deviation for any arbitrary
sized transistor.
2.3.2 Thermal noise errors
Thermal noise in a transistor occurs due to the random motion of the charge carri-
ers from thermal excitation and can create a random voltage fluctuation in conductors
[64,92]. Thermal noise has no correlation among different sample across time and has
a near uniform power spectral density. In advanced CMOS technology nodes, short
channel effects [49] exacerbate the effects of thermal noise and significantly impact
transistor noise performance [119]. The magnitude of thermal noise at any given
node can be represented in terms of a normal distribution with 0 mean and standard






where kB is the Boltzmann constant, T is the absolute temperature (Kelvin) and C
is the node capacitance (Farads).
2.3.3 Simple SRAM-like Weak PUF (Ref )
PUF cells produce random outputs due to mismatch in the cross-coupled inverters’
strengths due to manufacturing process variations and noise during evaluation. A
Weak PUF cell needs to have reliably identical behavior across multiple evaluations.
However, thermal noise affects each node in the circuit differently and hence, can drive
one of the cross-coupled inverter’s NMOS to an ON state, inducing a logic-0 state
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Figure 2.1: Standard cross-coupled inverter PUF cell (Ref )
its output. Across multiple evaluations, a cell with inadequate mismatch between
the cross-coupled inverters can produce different results and hence, be unreliable as
a Weak PUF.
In this work, to facilitate a resettable PUF, we make minor modifications to the ba-
sic cross-coupled devices by implementing additional pre-charge/discharge circuitry,
as shown in Figure 2.1. The enable signal (EN ), at logic-0, first pre-charges the OUT
and OUT to Vdd while keeping the footer NMOS (M7) in OFF state. The evaluation
phase begins by setting EN to logic-1 and depending on process variation, the cell
will settle into a particular state. To mimic thermal noise effects, we set the OUT and
OUT to Vdd,1 and Vdd,2. The voltages are obtained from a Gaussian distribution with
a mean of Vdd and variance given by (2.2). This design is an adaptation of similar
circuits proposed to enable TMV [85], Sense-Amplifier PUF [25], and a PUF based
on cross-coupled NOR cells [116].
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Figure 2.2: PUF cell with only pull-down network and active resistive loads (D1)
2.3.4 Study of various Cell designs
Here, we explore alternative PUF cell designs that are more sensitive to process
variations, resulting in greater mismatch between the cell cross-coupled elements. The
salient features and drawbacks of each alternative are also discussed. Only the cross-
coupled elements (dashed boxes) are altered with respect to Ref while the overall
circuit operation remains same.
2.3.4.1 Simple active loads (D1)
The first alternative we consider modifies the PUF cell pull-up network of the
previous inverter configuration by connecting a DC source, Vbias, to the PMOS gate
terminals. This converts the PMOS transistors into active loads whose current out-
puts depend on their threshold and input voltages. Figure2.2 shows this cross-coupled
design, but omits the precharge transistors for conciseness.
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In a simple inverter configuration, the currents in both the pull-up and pull-
down networks are affected by the inputs and process variation. In a low process
variation scenario, thermal noise will affect both networks in a differential manner
and has a greater chance of introducing error. By removing the input dependence
in one of the networks of each cross-coupled element (M1 or M3 in Figure 2.2), we
make the current through that network purely dependent on the process variation.
The constant source, Vbias, is shared by both cross-coupled elements and any noise
associated with this source will become common mode noise. The complimentary
network is used to drive the feedback loop. Hence, the circuit becomes more process
sensitive. Additionally, the footer NMOS prevents high static current flow due to the
pull-up network by breaking connection to the ground when the cell is not in use.
2.3.4.2 Parallel active loads (D2,D3)
We study the case of using parallel active loads, as shown in Figure 2.3. Applying
Kirchhoff’s Current Law (KCL) at the output node, OUT , we see a linear additive
relationship for the currents through the active loads. Taking a case of two active loads
in parallel at OUT node, let the currents in the two loads have a normal distribution




2), due to process variations, across
a population of PUF cells. The addition of such currents at OUT realize a current
with a variance that is the sum of the two variances (σ21 + σ
2
2). This concept can be
extended to multiple parallel loads. Hence, theoretically, this approach provides a
greater sensitivity to process variation than just a single active load (D1), which is
the simplest case of the parallel active loads configuration.
The size of the input connected NMOS transistors may need to be larger to ef-
fectively sink enough current to drive one of the outputs to a logic-0 in the presence
of multiple parallel PMOS loads. Also, complex biasing for the active loads may be
needed to further reduce the current that the pull-down network needs to handle.
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Figure 2.3: PUF cell with parallel active loads (D2,D3)
The multiple parallel loads and the need for a larger pull-down transistor adds to the
area overhead compared the simple case (D1).
2.3.4.3 Current Mirror loads (D4)
A current mirror has the property of providing a multiplier effect based on the
sizing of the mirror transistors. Hence, we explore replacing the simple load with a
current mirror load, as shown in Figure 2.4. The current mirror provides two addi-
tional venues to boost the process variation effects in the PUF cell: (a) the process
variation in the mirror transistors (say Mx1, Mx2 in Figure 2.4) affects the current
mirroring factor; (b) the process variation of the bias transistor (Mx3) of the current
mirror influences the base current that will be mirrored. These combined effects can
help increase the mismatch between the cross-coupled elements of the PUF cell and
hence, reduce error.
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Figure 2.4: PUF cell with current mirror loads (D4)
Similar to the aforementioned active load configurations, we need to generate the
appropriate bias voltages.
2.4 Results and Discussion
In this section, we will first contrast the reliability performance of various alterna-
tives explored in section 2.3.4 with the simple cross-coupled inverter PUF cell using
error rate as the metric. Then, the design Ref and select configurations (D2, D4) are
analyzed in greater detail illustrating the advantages of our approach, specifically, in
terms of reduction in ECC complexity and the associated area savings.
2.4.1 Error rate comparison
Our primary goal is to compare the reliability of each proposed alternative (D1→
D4) with respect to Ref. For this purpose, we assume room temperature (25 ◦C) and
obtain the output node capacitance for the cross-coupled elements of each design and
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calculate the standard deviation of thermal noise to be used for simulation according
to (2.2).
We simulate a cell instance over 1, 000 thermal noise value pairs to mimic 1, 000
power-ups of an SRAM-based Weak PUF cell. The output voltages are then classified
as either logic-0 or logic-1 based on a certain threshold, Vdd
2
V in our case. The error
rate for each instance is the percentage of trials in which the logic output of the cell
flipped compared to the base case with no thermal noise.
The footer NMOS is sized larger allowing the circuits to achieve near ground-
level voltage. The pull-up and pull-down transistor are sized to maximize process
sensitivity, according to (2.1), and the sizes for each design configuration are listed





The mean error rates obtained by simulating 10, 000 instances of each design, are
given in Table 2.1. As explained in Section 2.3.1, we use a low process variation
scenario (σV TH = 5 mV) to generate the results. All the design alternatives perform
significantly better than the design Ref with 4× to 9× reduction in error rates.
Furthermore, the parallel active loads designs (D2, D3) showcase the gains from
increasing the number of parallel transistors.
2.4.2 Flipping point analysis
To further illustrate the improvements afforded by the new designs over the simple
cross-coupled inverter cell, we conduct an experiment to compare the Ref design
against the alternatives D2 and D4, in terms of the amount of noise needed to change
the base state of a cell. First, we find the state of the cell outputs without the presence
of noise and then, add a DC offset to the corresponding pre-charge supply of one side
until finding the minimum voltage that can flip the cell outputs. We term this voltage
as the flipping voltage. We repeat the experiment for each design across 10, 000 cell
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Simple (Ref ) 90 90 20.79
Single Active Load (D1 ) 90 180 5.14
Parallel Loads
2 (D2 ) 90 180 4.53
3 (D3 ) 90 180 2.23




instances using the full process variation parameters and a 300 mV maximum offset
threshold. The histogram of the recorded flipping voltages for both Ref, D2 and D4
designs are shown in Figure 2.5. The distributions highlight that, on average, a much
larger noise perturbation is needed to affect the output states of D2 and D4 than
the Ref design. Consequently, more instantiated cells of D2 and D4 are likely to
have zero or very low error rates compared to Ref case. We should note that this
experiment offers more of a qualitative insight into the noise resilience of the circuits
as it is extremely unlikely that the differential thermal noise values will reach over
20 mV for any of the instantiated designs.
2.4.3 Voltage and Temperature Variations
To assess the impact of variations in supply voltage and temperature, we instan-
tiate 100, 000 instances, each, of Ref, D2 and D4 using the full process and channel
length variation parameters [4]. For each design, we consider 25◦C and 1 V as the
nominal temperature and supply voltage settings, respectively. The outputs are ob-
tained by sweeping either the temperature or the voltage, keeping the other constant.
We do not introduce circuit thermal noise in these simulations in order to sensitize the
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Figure 2.5: Flipping voltage comparison between Ref, D2 and D4
outputs only to variations in voltage/temperature. For each design, the 100, 000-bit
binary result at each temperature/voltage is compared to the binary string obtained
under nominal conditions. The percentage of errors for temperature and voltage
sweeps are plotted in Figure 2.6. We see that D2 and D4 have a lower number of
bit errors compared to Ref design across various voltages/temperatures. In addi-
tion to being highly resistant to thermal noise, this result shows the proposed PUF
alternatives to perform better than the Ref design under environmental variations.
2.4.4 Reducing ECC circuitry overhead
As the inherent cell error rate is reduced considerably by using the alternative cell
designs, we can make appreciable gains by reducing the amount of post-processing
required to make a highly reliable Weak PUF implementation (error rate ≤ 10−6). To
obtain an idea of the amount of savings to be expected, we examine the Ref, D2 and
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Figure 2.6: Percentage of bit errors in 100, 000-bit strings for Ref, D2 and D4, com-
pared with (25◦C, 1 V) case
D4 designs. We instantiate 10, 000 different cells of each design and obtain the error
rates as described in section 2.4.1 under thermal noise and with full process variation.
Bösch et al.[28] have conducted extensive studies on the implementation of ECC
in hardware for the purpose of extracting stable keys from SRAM-based Weak PUFs.
The authors explore the use of various error correction codes to correct errors in a
binary string with certain error probability (pb). However, Roel Maes presented a
new 2-parameter error model that highlighted the fact that a population of SRAM
cells will possess a distribution of error rates [78]. The author shows that the more
accurate 2-parameter model can produce surprisingly different results from the simple
homogeneous error rate assumed in earlier works when used to estimate the key failure
rates for an SRAM-based Weak PUF to generate a stable 128-bit key. Following the
same procedures detailed in their work, we estimate the parameters of the 2-parameter
error model by using the error rates obtained from the selected cell designs. The curve-
fitted probability mass functions (PMFs) are shown in Figure 2.7, using continuous
lines for clarity. We see that D2 and D4 each have over 95 % of the cells producing
0 errors in 1000 trials, compared to 83 % for Ref design.
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Figure 2.7: Curve-fitted PMFs for Ref, D2 and D4
Our final target is to obtain a robust key of 128 bits (with error rate ≤ 10−6).
We consider the Reed-Muller (RM) ECC codes for which we can estimate the corre-
sponding areas using gate counts provided by Bösch [28] and the areas of the relevant
gates from the Nangate 45 nm cell library [5]. By simulating 1 million key genera-
tion systems and altering the ECC code parameters we found the smallest codes that
would enable more than 99 % of the simulated keys to have an error rate ≤ 10−6.
Then, the areas are calculated for the best code implementations. The unit PUF cell
area for the Ref, D2 and D4 designs were found to be 1µm2, 1.25µm2 and 1.5µm2,
respectively. The final results and relevant details are tabulated in Table 2.2. The
alternatives are able to reduce the area requirements by more than 60 %.
The above simulation demonstrates the advantages of our approach in terms of
ECC implementations. It may be possible to achieve better results with different
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Ref RM[64,7,15] 1408 2286.3 —
D2 RM[16,5,3] 352 824.1 63.96
D4 RM[16,5,3] 352 912.1 60.11
ECC implementations. Although different error correction schemes and codes may
be used, the results shown are not unique to this scheme, and it is expected that the
increase in cell reliability should produce similar area savings in any such techniques.
2.5 Conclusion
Weak PUFs, especially SRAM-based, have gained popularity for application in key
generation. However, such keys can suffer from reliability issues due to system noise.
To address this, various ECC and fuzzy extraction techniques have been proposed.
These schemes depend on a large number of initial bits sourced from Weak PUFs
to generate stable keys due to the unreliability of the PUF cells. In this work, we
address and improve the Weak PUF reliability by presenting new designs that harness
inherent process variations to a greater degree than conventional SRAM-like cells.
Our designs perform well in mature technology nodes with low process variations,
and with respect to various noise sources. Also, lowering the error rate of the PUF
cell allows us to scale down ECC resources required to generate a stable key.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPROVING RELIABILITY OF WEAK PUFS VIA
INTELLIGENT ACCELERATED AGING
3.1 Introduction
Among the prior approaches to improve PUF reliability, accelerating device aging
or burn-in has received increasing attention [26, 46, 85]. To accelerate aging, devices
are subjected to temperature and voltage stress in a burn-in chamber. For SRAM-
like Weak PUFs, the burn-in process can be beneficial towards increasing the inherent
mismatch between the cross-couple inverters so that a PUF output attains greater
immunity to noise.
While burn-in is beneficial, it can significantly inflate production costs due to
long baking times to maximize the number of reliable integrated circuit (ICs). The
straight-forward way to determine the bake times is to account for the worst-case
design corners. This can prove detrimental to utilization of PUFs in low-cost ap-
plications, like Smart Cards, and for high volume manufacturing. Hence, there is a
compelling need to reduce the burn-in time. Integrating a mechanism for the IC to
provide certain information to the manufacturer to aid in calculating the minimum
burn-in time, without compromising the security of the PUF, can prove advantageous
and offer considerable increase in manufacturing throughput.
In this chapter, we present a method to reduce the burn-in time by quantifying the
minimum burn-in requirements for each Weak PUF cell. A low-cost proxy is used to
represent the inherent cross-coupled inverter mismatch in terms of the PUF error rate.
The error rates of the instantiated PUFs in an IC are measured and used to decide
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the burn-in requirements. A low-overhead architecture is presented to automate the
collection of necessary data. Also, the effect of alternate SRAM-like PUF designs and
different transistor technology implementations on the burn-in process are analyzed.
3.2 Background and Motivation
In this section, we discuss some relevant background with regards to device aging
and burn-in. We also discuss temporal majority voting (TMV) technique in detail as
it will be utilized in our methodology. Prior research regarding previous techniques
for improving Weak PUF reliability has been discussed in Section 2.2.
3.2.1 Temporal Majority Voting
The area overhead from implementing traditional ECC blocks and the number of
initial PUF bits required scales superlinearly as the error rate increases. A simple,
circuit-based way to reduce the error rate using Temporal Majority Voting (TMV)
has been explored by Mathew et al.[85] and Xiao et al.[129]. Mathew et al.[85] also
explored burn-in and dark bits evaluation for the purpose of reducing error rates.
Design changes were required to enable voting and synchronous design helped im-
prove uniqueness. However, the approach can only correct error rates of < 8 % and
additional techniques are necessary for practical applications.
In this work, we will assume a simple counter-based TMV for error correction
during regular operation of the PUF. As an example, a simple 4-bit counter based
TMV counts from 0 to 15 and hence, can be used for 15-way voting. If the resultant
value after 15 evaluations of the cell’s response is greater than 8, then the final value
can be classified as 1 or else it can be classified as 0. The mathematical model of the
TMV is a binomial counting process and hence, the reduction in error rate can be
calculated analytically. For example, a PUF cell whose error rate is 1− p produces a
final error rate Pe(N) given by,
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where k = (N + 1)/2 (as N is odd) when an N -way voting is used [74]. The circuit
implementation of the TMV typically consists of an n-bit counter where N = 2n − 1
. The counter is incremented by 1 if the response from the PUF cell is 1.
Using (3.1), we plot the initial and final error rates for 4-bit (15-way), 5-bit (31-
way) and 6-bit (63-way) TMVs in Figure 3.1. The selection of the TMV would be
based on the maximum error rate that the system needs to correct (final error rate
≤ 10−6). For this work, we utilize a 4-bit TMV for regular operation, noting that it
can correct a maximum error of 6 %.
3.2.2 Negative Bias Temperature Instability
Transistor aging has become a significant reliability concern for current CMOS
technology. Among various aging mechanisms, Bias Temperature Instability (BTI)
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is considered the dominant aging mechanism, causing the threshold voltage of the
transistor to increase. There are two BTI mechanisms: (i) Negative BTI (NBTI)
affecting the PMOS transistors and (ii) Positive BTI (PBTI) affecting the NMOS
transistors. NBTI results from continuous trap generation in Si-SiO2 interface when
a negative voltage is applied to the PMOS gate (stress). Under stressed operating
conditions (i.e., On-state, negative gate bias at elevated temperature and supply
voltage), Si-H bonds near the interface continue to break and generate interfacial
traps which contribute to an increase in Vth. Due to the Vth degradation, NBTI
results in poor drive current, lower noise margin and shorter device lifetime.
The NBTI-induced threshold voltage shift is a function of supply voltage, tem-
perature and many technology parameters. Various models have been proposed in
the literature to accurately estimate the threshold voltage degradation ∆Vth due to
NBTI. Kang et al.proposed a compact threshold voltage degradation model consid-
ering the temporal NBTI variation in short channel devices [67]. Paul et al.showed
that the maximum circuit delay degradation due to NBTI closely follows the same
fractional power dependency to time as the Vth degradation with an appropriate scale
factor [97]. Kumar et al.have proposed an efficient AC NBTI model for circuit sim-
ulations [73]. Vattikonda et al.have proposed a further improved circuit compatible
NBTI model to consider AC relaxation effects and technology dependent parameters
[123].
FinFET : The NBTI model for FinFETs is the same as (3.2.2). The effect of NBTI
and mitigation techniques for FinFET SRAMs has been explored in detail by Wang
et al.[128].
















Kv = f(Vdd − Vth, T )
where α is the duty cycle, T is the temperature, Tclk is the clock cycle, and other
parameters are technology parameters previously defined in [23].
3.2.3 Burn-In (Accelerated Aging)
IC designers and manufacturers are concerned about quality and reliability over a
product’s lifetime. To ensure economic viability, it is desirable to remove defective de-
vices from the population before shipping them to the customer. Consequently, many
ICs undergo a burn-in process after fabrication to accelerate failures that manifest in
early-life which are primarily caused by process and manufacturing defects. However,
under burn-in conditions, increased junction temperature (average temperature of the
silicon substrate) increases the leakage current and increased leakage current further
increases the junction temperature. Thus, manufacturers try to control the junction
temperature by removing the heat from the IC. If the rate of heat generation be-
comes greater than the rate of heat removal, junction temperature starts increasing.
This condition is called thermal runaway [122]. It has been shown that the setup for
burn-in conditions must evolve by reducing either the ambient temperature or the
thermal resistance or a combination of both of them. For example, in 130 nm process
technology, the junction temperature should be kept below 110 °C with a thermal
resistance of 0.5 °C/W and ambient temperature of 80 °C to avoid thermal runaway
[122].
In the case of a Weak PUF, the response can be made more reliable by increasing
the magnitude of the difference in the threshold voltages of the two PMOS devices in
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the cross-coupled inverters (M1, M3), in Figure 3.4. One such method of improving
the reliability is to exploit NBTI aging effects to reinforce the desired (or “golden”)
response of the PUF cell. This is done by finding the golden outputs (OUT, OUT ) of
the PUF cell and forcing the opposite values onto them via the access transistors (M5,
M6). Increasing the temperature and/or applying voltage stress for a certain amount
of time accelerates the aging of the devices in a beneficial manner [26,46,85]. Hence,
by improving the PUF reliability via burn-in, the number of defective ICs are reduced.
3.2.4 PUF Reliability using accelerated aging
The aging effect on PUF reliability has been studied extensively by Garg et al.[46]
and Maes et al.proposed techniques to counter the effects [82]. Bhargava et al.[26]
utilized aging via Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) aided PUF reliability.
3.3 Methodology
In this section, we discuss the PUF system design to enable the IC to output the
maximum error rate observed. Later, we elaborate on a mechanism to correlate the
error rate to the inherent mismatch in the PUF cell that allows us to find the burn-in
time required to make all the PUF cells reliable.
3.3.1 Weak PUF System Design
In Figure 3.2, we describe the proposed system to measure the maximum error
rate in a PUF. This was initially described in our paper [59]. The system consists
of a PUF cell array that is connected to an array of multiplexers (Muxes). These
muxes will direct the PUF outputs to the relevant counters based on the mode of
operation. A Central Control unit oversees the entire operation of the PUF system.
The circuit operates in two modes: (i) Design for Reliability (DfR) mode and (ii)
Regular Operation (OP) mode.
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Figure 3.2: Block Diagram of the proposed reliability enhancement scheme (from [59],
our earlier paper)
(i) Design for Reliability (DfR) mode: Prior to burn-in, the circuit is initialized
into (DfR) mode to obtain the maximum error rate among the PUF cells. The control
unit directs each PUF output via the MUX array to a 10-bit counter and performs
1024 pre-charge and evaluations cycles on each cell. During every evaluation, the
counter increments if the output is logic-1. The large counter allows us to get an
accurate measurement of the error rate of a cell. Also, a single 10-bit counter is
enough as this process is carried out prior to burn-in and is not time intensive like
burn-in. Even if a PUF cell takes 1 ns for each evaluation, then each cell error rate is
obtained in ≈ 1µs.
The counter value is fed to the Burn-in Optimizer unit that first determines the
correct PUF cell output. If the count is below 512 (ideally 0), then the correct
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output is determined to be logic-0. If the counter is between 0 and 512, then this
count becomes the error rate for the cell (out of 1023). For logic-1, the count would
be > 512 (ideally 1023). To find the error rate, we subtract the current count from
1023. The estimated logic value (PUF value) of the PUF cell is fed back to Central
Control unit which then writes the opposite value to the PUF cell for the purpose of
burn-in.
The Burn-in Optimizer also maintains an internal register that stores the current
maximum error rate (initialized to 0 on start-up). Each calculated error rate is
compared to current maximum using a comparator and set as the new maximum if
the error rate is greater. All PUF cells are processed to obtain the final maximum
error rate. A further optimization is possible by utilizing the maximum error, 6 %,
that a 4-bit TMV can correct. The Error Threshold can be set to ≈ 62 (6 % of 1023)
and each calculated error rate is compared against this before comparing with the
stored maximum. The final IC output (Max Error Rate) is the maximum error only
if it is greater than the error threshold and otherwise, output is a 0. Such ICs would
not need burn-in as the TMV is sufficient.
In certain cases, the designer may wish to account for an acceptable yield loss and
use more PUF cells than required. Hence, the Mask Array can be utilized to select
the most reliable PUF cells. The Burn-in Optimizer is used to set the mask bits to
indicate reliable cells. It can also possess an additional counter to keep track of cells
with error rates of ≤ 6 % (for TMV). In case the system finds the required number of
cells, it can output a 0 max error rate to further reduce burn-in requirements. After
burn-in, the Burn-in Optimizer can be reused to set the final mask bits. Masking
has been shown to help improve the reliability of the Weak PUF system [85]. The
entire operation of the Burn-in Optimizer is illustrated as a flowchart, as shown in
Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Flowchart illustrating the operation of Burn-in Optimizer
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Figure 3.4: SRAM-like cross-coupled inverter PUF cell (Ref ) [126]
(ii) Regular Operation (OP) mode: In this mode, the control unit queries and
directs the PUF outputs to the 4-bit TMVs. We can use multiple TMVs to speed up
the PUF evaluations for convenient real-time operation. As the burn-in process will
have increased the mismatch of the PUF cells by an appropriate amount, the TMVs
should be able to correct any observed errors as they will be well below the TMV
threshold.
3.3.2 Process Variation and Error Rate
We utilize the SRAM cell design, whose operation is detailed in Section 2.3.3 and
re-illustrated in Figure 3.4 as the reference design, termed Ref.
Utilizing the maximum error rate produced by a PUF system, we aim to find the
current inherent mismatch, in terms of threshold voltages, that exists between the
PMOS transistors (M1, M3), in Figure 3.4. This acts as a proxy that represents the
inherent mismatch between the cross-coupled elements in the actual PUF cell and
will aid us in determining the amount of NBTI aging needed to make the cell reliable.
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Figure 3.5: Error rate correlation with PUF cell threshold voltage mismatch
To correlate the error rate with a threshold voltage mismatch value, we perform a
set of SPICE simulations on the Weak PUF cell. Circuit thermal noise is considered
as the source of errors in the PUF output. The noise is applied to the circuit in a
differential manner at Vdd,1 and Vdd,2, as shown Figure 3.4. The inherent mismatch
of a PUF cell is approximated by varying the threshold voltage in one of the PMOS
transistors (M3 in our case) in steps of 1 mV up to a certain maximum. A large
number of evaluations are performed under varying thermal noise for each step and
the error rate is calculated by comparing the values with the output for zero thermal
noise.
An example, as shown in Figure 3.5, plots the error rates against the increasing
threshold voltage mismatches for a PUF cell, as shown in Figure 3.4, in 45 nm tech-
nology [6] using minimum sized transistors. This gives us an approximate correlation
between the error rate of a cell and the inherent PMOS transistors mismatch. Know-
ing that a 4-bit (15-way) TMV can correct a maximum of 6 % error, we see that any
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cell with an inherent mismatch of ≥ 19 mV can be handled by the TMV. The cells
with lower mismatch are not TMV-correctable and become the target of our burn-
in efforts. The worst-case threshold voltage shift, when the maximum error rate is
50 %, for the burn-in process is set at a higher value than 19 mV to account for the
approximations made in our analysis. This value becomes the total target mismatch
required to create a fully reliable PUF system. We also note that an error rate of
50 % would represent the ideal true random number generator (TRNG). Based on the
observed maximum error, which represents the lowest mismatch observed among the
PUF cells of a particular IC, we can calculate the threshold voltage shift required from
the burn-in process to reach the target mismatch. In a real-world scenario, the maxi-
mum observed error rates are likely to be below 50 % and hence, the needed threshold
voltage shift from burn-in will be less than the set target value. This translates into
significant savings with regards to burn-in time.
3.4 Burn-in time reduction
In this section, we explore the advantage of using the proposed solution presented
in Section 3.3 considering Weak PUF systems that need to generate 128 reliable bits.
The reported results consider a cumulative burn-in time where we assume that only a
single IC undergoes the accelerated aging at a time. In practical situations, different
manufacturers can utilize different ways. Hence, it is difficult to assume just one
arbitrary process.
3.4.1 Weak PUF Designs
Along with the simple SRAM-like Weak PUF design (Ref ), we extend the analysis
using other PUF designs proposed in Chapter 2. It was shown that connecting either
the pull-up or pull-down transistors of the cross-coupled inverters in the PUF to a
bias voltage can provide significant benefits towards reliability. Since we consider
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PMOS NMOS λ1 λ2
Cells with
0 error (%)
Simple (Ref ) 90 nm 90 nm 0.292 1.906 83
Two Parallel Loads (D1 ) 180 nm 90 nm 0.188 2.395 96
Current Mirror Load (D2 ) 180 nm 90 nm 0.191 2.491 97
FinFET (F1 ) 1 fin 1 fin 0.413 1.595 60
NBTI as the aging mechanism of interest for the burn-in process, we modify the
circuits so that the pull-down transistors are connected to bias voltages while the
pull-up transistor are cross-coupled to form the inverters. For this work, we choose
the parallel active loads design with two parallel NMOS transistors (D1 ), as shown in
Figure 3.6, and the current mirror-based design with NMOS current mirrors (D2 ), as
shown in Figure 3.7. The access transistors and the pre-charge voltages connected to
OUT and OUT are the same as the Ref design, shown in Figure 3.4, and are omitted
in the circuit diagrams for clarity. The transistors are sized to allow maximum process
variation sensitivity except for the footer (M2), which is sized larger to allow proper
operation of the circuit. Vbias was set to 0.5 V for D1 and 0 V for D2.
Conventional CMOS scaling beyond the 45nm technology node is severely con-
strained by pronounced threshold voltage (Vth) fluctuations resulting from Short
Channel Effects (SCE) and Random Dopant Fluctuations (RDF) due to process vari-
ations [41, 105, 115, 120]. Hence, FinFETs were developed to facilitate the continued
scaling of technology nodes. FinFET devices exhibit better electrostatic character-
istics with respect to SCE as the gate, or fin, wraps around a thin slice of silicon
(channel) [104]. The greater control over the channel allows FinFETs to have lower
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Figure 3.6: Modified parallel active loads-based PUF design (D1 ) [96]
Figure 3.7: Modified current mirror-based PUF design (D2 ) [96]
leakage current and power consumption over bulk CMOS. We wished to study the
effect on burn-in requirements when using FinFETs as the basis for constructing the
39
Weak PUF. We considered only the Ref design, as shown in Figure 3.4, and instan-
tiated the PUF, termed as F1, using 20 nm FinFETs using predictive technology
models [7]. The number of fins were fixed at 1 for all transistors except the footer
(M7 in Ref ) which had 2 fins for proper current sinking. The supply voltage was set
at 0.9 V.
The specifications for the various designs are tabulated in Table 3.1.
3.4.2 Thermal Noise Errors
The random motion of the charge carriers from thermal excitation induces thermal
noise in transistors and can create random voltage fluctuations in conductors [64,92].
Thermal noise has a near uniform power spectral density and there is no correlation
among different samples across time. Short channel effects [49] can exacerbate the
effects of thermal noise in advanced CMOS technology nodes, causing significant
impact on transistor noise performance [119]. The magnitude of thermal noise at any
given node can be represented in terms of a normal distribution with 0 mean and






where kB is the Boltzmann constant, T is the absolute temperature (Kelvin) and C
is the node capacitance (Farads).
We record the node capacitances at OUT and OUT in each design (Ref, D1, D2,
F1 ), under no process variation condition, to determine the amount of thermal noise
to be added to Vdd,1 and Vdd,2.
3.4.3 Error Rate vs Mismatch
Using the procedure described in section 3.3.2, we seek to find the correlation
proxies for each of the designs being considered. For the planar MOSFETs (Ref, D1,
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Figure 3.8: Error rate correlation with PUF cell threshold voltage mismatch for
alternate Weak PUF designs ({D1,D2}) based on [96]
D2 ), we utilized the 45 nm technology [6] to instantiate the cells. The supply voltage
(Vdd) is set to 1 V. We shift the threshold voltage of one of the PMOS transistors
(M3) in steps of 1 mV up to a maximum of 150 mV. This represents the proxy for
the total mismatch and helps simplify further analysis. At each step, we perform
2000 evaluations of the cell under varying thermal noise conditions, using (3.3), and
calculate the error rates. Figure 3.8 shows the results which highlight the fact that
the alternate designs (D1 and D2 ) have a greater process sensitivity than Ref as
every step increase in mismatch reduces the observed error significantly and the error
rate reaches 0 % with lower amount of mismatch.
In cases where incorporating the alternate designs may not be desired, we sought
to explore a technique to improve the performance of the existing SRAM-based PUF
(Ref ). Boosting the supply voltage has been shown to be beneficial for the operation
of an SRAM [98]. However, we must also be aware of increase in leakage power. For
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Figure 3.9: Error rate correlation with PUF cell threshold voltage mismatch for Ref
under nominal and boosted supply voltage (1.2 V)
this work, we study the performance of Ref when the supply voltage is boosted to
1.2 V. The results, as shown in Figure 3.9, do indicate that there is a decrease in the
error rate with increased mismatch under higher supply voltage. A designer can gen-
erate any number of such proxies at different voltages and use the data to adaptively
choose what supply voltage needs to be set for the PUF block, which in turn decides
the burn-in time. This is due to the fact that we only output the maximum error
rate from an IC which is later used with the correlation data. However, such supply
adaptability increases the complexity of the overall system design.
Replacing the planar MOSFET based PUF (Ref ) with FinFET-based design (F1 )
provides better performance in cases where the inherent mismatch is higher, as shown
in Figure 3.10. It should be noted that the FinFETs are more susceptible to thermal
noise (from (3.3)) as the node capacitances are lower due to the smaller technology
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Figure 3.10: Error rate correlation with PUF cell threshold voltage mismatch for
planar MOSFET (Ref ) and FinFET (F1 ) designs
node (20 nm) compared to the planar MOSFET. The results show that FinFET based
implementations can be viable as Weak PUFs even with the higher noise.
3.4.4 Modeling Process Variation
3.4.4.1 Planar MOSFET
Manufacturing induced process variations are modeled as random parametric vari-
ations in the threshold voltage (V TH) and channel length (L) of each transistor in
a circuit. The values are obtained from a normal distribution, N(µ, σ2), where the
mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) are determined based on the technology node
used. Transistor geometry has an impact on the susceptibility of a device to process
variations with larger devices experiencing less fluctuations. In terms of threshold








where (Wmin,Lmin) are the minimum possible width and length of a device, respec-
tively, and (W ,L) are the sizes used in the design. σV TH0 is the standard deviation
of threshold voltage for the minimum sized device.
In this work, we instantiate the planar MOSFET PUF cell designs (Ref, D1, D2 )
with 45 nm NCSU FreePDK45 models [6]. Typically, for 45 nm node, a standard devi-
ation of 53 mV for threshold voltage and 10 % channel length variation are considered
[4]. Equation (3.4) is used to calculate the standard deviation for threshold voltage
of any arbitrary sized transistor.
3.4.4.2 FinFET
While FinFETs are not affected by RDF due to undoped channel, they are suscep-
tible to Work Function Variation (WFV) caused by irregularities in fin surface from
the manufacturing process [86]. Hence, WFV has the greatest impact on thresh-
old voltage variation. For this work, we consider a standard deviation of 30 mV for
threshold voltage to represent the process variation in FinFET transistors [86].
3.4.5 Heterogeneous Error Model
In realistic scenarios, a collection of Weak PUF cells would have a distribution
of errors. This heterogeneous error model is advantageous in modeling real PUF
systems as a homogeneous error model can overestimate the required ECC resources
[78]. Also, the homogeneous model would provide no useful information for driving
the burn-in process as all cells would be assumed to have the same error rate and
hence, the same amount of process mismatch.
For this work, 10, 000 instances of the PUF cell, for each design, were simulated
with the relevant process variation parameters, as described in sections 3.4.4. Each
cell was evaluated 1000 times under varying thermal noise (as determined in section
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3.4.2) at 25 °C. The error rate was obtained by comparing with a simulation with no
noise. Utilizing the resulting data with the mathematical framework for the hetero-
geneous error model [78], we can generate error rates for an arbitrary number of PUF
cells for each given design. The relevant 2-parameter model details for each PUF
design are tabulated in Table 3.1. We also list the percentage of cells among an arbi-
trary population that would possess 0 % error for each design, given the 2-parameter
model data. Due to the higher thermal noise susceptibility, FinFET implementation
(F1 ) offers the lowest amount of 60 %. This is an indication that the FinFET based
design will offer less savings than a comparable planar MOSFET design in terms of
total burn-in time.
3.4.6 Cumulative Burn-in Time
Since our target is to obtain 128 stable bits from a PUF system, we first consider
the system has 128 initial PUF cells and all the cells need to be made reliable. Next,
we considered a scenario where a 2 % yield loss might be acceptable and masking is
used. For this case, we reused (3.1) with {k = 128, p = 0.98} to find the value of N
that would result in Pe(N) ≤ 10−6 (failure rate of 1 ppm). The result showed that we
needed 144 initial PUF cells.
For all the designs considered in this paper (Ref, D1, D2, F1 ), we assume that
the burn-in temperature is 100 °C and the stress voltage is 1.1 V and utilize (3.2.2) to
calculate the time required. The relevant device parameters for the NBTI equation
are obtained from the NCSU FreePDK models [6] for planar devices and from PTM
models for the FinFET [7].
For obtaining the cumulative burn-in time, 1million PUF systems were generated
for the 128 and 144 cells/system cases for each Weak PUF design using the heteroge-
neous error model. For each PUF system, the threshold voltage mismatch was found










































































































































































































































































































mismatch in each system, the data from section 3.4.3 and the mismatch representing
the 6 % error rate (for 4-bit TMV) were used. Our target threshold voltage shift (also
the worst-case shift) was set by increasing the TMV mismatch found for each design
by 30 %. This is to account for the approximations in our methodology for correlating
error rate and inherent mismatch. Table 3.2 also lists the amount of time needed to
increase the PMOS threshold voltage due to NBTI by the target mismatch value.
For each system, the max error rate indicates the lowest amount of inherent mis-
match and decides the amount of threshold voltage shift needed to reach the target.
The shift needed is used in (3.2.2) to calculate the burn-in time. The cumulative
burn-in time (Optimized) for 1million PUF systems with 128 and 144 initial cells
are recorded in Table 3.2 for each design. We also note that without the proposed
solution, a manufacturer might need to assume that each IC needs to undergo the
maximum burn-in for each design.
From the results, in Table 3.2, we see that intelligent burn-in offers significant
savings compared to constant worst-case scenario driven burn-in. Also, using extra
bits (144) and masking results in reduced burn-in time compared to using just 128
cells/system. D2 offers the best results for any PUF system as the burn-in required is
negligible compared to other designs. Additionally, combining the alternate designs
(D1 and D2 ) with masking and extra bits can allow us to forgo burn-in entirely.
Consequently, these designs are attractive for low-cost applications where dedicated
PUF circuits would make more sense in terms of resource utilization. The FinFET
(F1 ) results show that we need to use extra bits for greater reliability, but the lower
cell area for the technology allows us to easily incorporate more cells.
The results discussed here show the relative performance of various designs, but
are ultimately dependent on the amount of error correction afforded to us by the
TMVs used during regular operation. Vijayakumar et al.have shown that using an
Up-Down counter [126] allows them to correct twice the error compared to a similarly
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sized regular TMV. In actual designs, using better error correction reduces the target
mismatch required by the burn-in process, but such considerations must be weighed
by a designer against various constraints such as available area, power requirements
and so on.
Resource Overheads : We considered a 144-PUFs system and calculated the area
overhead from the Burn-in Optimizer, Central Control, Mask Array and 10-bit counter
described in section 3.3. The rest of the circuitry, for TMV-based reliable bit gen-
eration is assumed to already be present in the system. Using the 45 nm standard
cell library from Nangate [5], the area overhead was found to be 500µm2 (Burn-
in optimizer costs 149µm2). This is a small overhead as the majority of the area
(≈ 2500µm2) for an efficient implementation is occupied by the TMV counters, PUF
cells and the mux arrays.
The primary testing time overhead is from obtaining the maximum error rate
which entails serially querying each PUF cell 1024 times (10-bit counter) and pro-
cessing the results. For a 144-PUFs system, this requires ∼ 150, 000 cycles in total.
At a test frequency of 10 MHz, for example, each chip will need 15 ms to generate the
results. However, in the cases where no burn-in is required, the designer can directly
proceed to final key enrollment phase. The Burn-in Optimizer is only used to set the
Mask Array and the system operates at its final intended frequency, which is greater
than the test frequency.
3.5 Conclusion
Weak PUFs have been extensively proposed for security applications such as
key/ID generation. Such applications require the PUFs to be highly reliable even
in the presence of noise. To ameliorate the noise susceptibility of the PUF outputs,
many different techniques have been proposed. One such method is to utilize burn-
in/accelerated aging for improving PUF reliability. Our work focuses on a method-
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ology to create a PUF system that enables the calculation of minimum burn-in time
for an IC. We obtain results for various SRAM-like Weak PUF designs which show a
significant reduction in burn-in times, providing large savings during the post-silicon
stages of the manufacturing process. Further, results show that FinFET based im-




REALIZING ROBUST STRONG PUFS USING
WEIGHTLESS NEURAL NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Section 1.1.2, Strong PUFs provide an exponential number of
CRPs and can be suitable for authentication applications as lightweight hardware
roots-of-trust. Ideally, PUFs need to possess high uniqueness and reliability (espe-
cially Weak PUFs) to provide robust security. Furthermore, Strong PUFs can be
targeted with model-building attacks using machine learning techniques and thus,
need to be resilient against cloning.
Unfortunately, practical Strong PUF implementations can suffer from reliability
issues [65,124] and also, can be cloned with high accuracy by machine learning attacks
[107, 125]. For use in applications like IoTs, unreliability can affect the number of
CRPs required to properly distinguish a PUF-equipped integrated circuit (IC) from
billions of other such devices [103]. Hence, there is still a need to design Strong PUFs
that can be fully reliable and offer high resistance to machine learning attacks.
Artificial neural networks mimic biological neuron functions for the purpose of
achieving effective pattern recognition capabilities. Weightless Neural Networks (WNNs)
are a class of artificial networks that utilize excitatory/inhibitory signaling to simulate
a neuron’s dendritic tree. Wilkie, Stonham & Aleksander’s Recognition Device (WiS-
ARD) was the first WNN model to be distributed commercially [17]. It provides an
efficient and simple implementation that can be realized using random-access memory
(RAM).
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This chapter explores adapting the simple WNN architecture and reliable Weak
PUFs to create reliable Strong PUFs that can also exhibit high uniqueness and provide
a high level of machine learning resistance. SRAM cells have persistent, yet random
power-up values and are the most promising choice for creating Weak PUFs [50, 57].
Reliability of a Weak PUF is critical and has received extensive attention in research
[29, 39, 80, 81, 85, 126]. In this work, we first combine the WiSARD WNN model
and SRAM’s PUF properties to realize Strong PUFs and later, utilize bits produced
from an initial entropy source, consisting of a set of highly reliable Weak PUFs, to
load the contents of the WiSARD WNN RAMs in order to provide a robust Strong
PUF architecture. Since the initial Weak PUF bits are made reliable, this enables
us to extend the reliability to the final Strong PUF. Using the WNN classification
phase, we can conceive a Strong PUF by providing the challenge as the input pattern
and extracting the output from the WNN as the response. We illustrate various
architectures based on the WiSARD model to showcase multiple Strong PUF designs.
Each architecture is analyzed to obtain uniqueness, reliability and machine learning
resistance metrics. This work shows that it is possible to build a Strong PUF using
neural networks obtaining high machine learning resistance while maintaining good
uniqueness and reliability. Additionally, we explore the minimum size of the initial
reliable Weak PUF entropy source that can still offer high uniqueness and machine
learning resistance.
4.2 Background
In this section, we briefly explore the relevant background regarding PUFs, their
reliability and machine learning resistance. Later, we discuss previous work on
Weightless Neural Networks. The relevant prior research into improving the relia-
bility of Weak PUFs has been detailed in Section 2.2.
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4.2.1 PUFs
Pappu et al.introduced Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) as an one-way func-
tion to map challenges to unique responses [93]. The promise of Strong PUFs arose
from the supposed complexity of the challenge-response mapping in each PUF and
the uniqueness of such mappings across chips, which would ideally make the PUFs
resistant to model building attacks. One of the earliest PUFs, called the Arbiter PUF
[75], did not exhibit the salient properties and could be easily cloned [107]. Multiple
alterations were proposed, like using XOR operations, to increase the resistance and
yet, were still broken [107].
Unlike digital PUFs, analog circuits were proposed to harness non-linear behavior
of CMOS transistors under certain operating conditions as a means to increase the
attack resistance of Strong PUFs. Current-based [65,71] and voltage-based techniques
[124] have been shown to be resistant against Support Vector Machine (SVM) learning
algorithm, which had broken the previous digital PUF implementations. However,
Vijayakumar et al.showed that ensemble meta-algorithms were a new class of machine
learning algorithms that could effectively model even the analog PUFs with great
accuracy [125]. Further, side-channel and fault based attacks have also been utilized
to increase the modeling accuracy to break PUFs [70,72,130].
Irrespective of the Strong PUF models proposed, they all had reliability issues.
While this can be mitigated by the fact that we have an exponential number of
CRPs available and we can set a threshold of acceptable responses for practical use in
authentication, the threshold level increases with a decrease in PUF reliability. This
increases the number of CRPs needed to authenticate a device in real-world scenarios
and thus, raises resource costs [103].
SRAM-based Weak PUFs have been studied extensively in previous research [50,
57]. In contrast, Holcomb and Fu proposed a Strong PUF using SRAM cells in
a column of a memory block which are pre-loaded with values based on an input
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challenge. The PUF output is generated by reading multiple cells in a column at
once to create a contention at the sense amplifier, which produces the final response
[56]. Bhargava et al.also explored the application of Weak PUFs to create Strong
PUFs by extracting a stable secret key from Weak PUFs as an input to an AES
block. The plain text input is considered as the challenge and the response is the
cipher text generated by the AES block [24]. In this chapter, we utilize a similar
concept of generating stable Weak PUF bits. The wealth of techniques available to
improve the reliability of Weak PUFs, as detailed in Section 2.2, allows us to create
an efficient implementation that yields the desired number of stable bits for later use
in neural network architectures to realize robust Strong PUFs.
4.2.2 Weightless Neural Networks
Weightless Neural Networks (WNNs) [17] are abstract models of biological neu-
rons where each neuron is represented by a Random Access Memory (RAM) node.
This model offers an attractive practical solution to pattern recognition and artificial
consciousness applications, due to its representation of neurons in a binary format and
due to the capability to implement such networks using existing memory resources in
devices.
WiSARD (Wilkie, Stoneham and Aleksander’s Recognition Device) was one of
the first WNN model developed [16] and was inspired by the n-tuple classifier [27].
Each class is represented by a structure called Discriminator, which comprises of a
set of RAMs, composed of one-bit words, to store the relevant information during the
training phase which will be used during the classification phase. The Discriminator
inputs can be from an arbitrary source and only need to be converted to binary for
use. A binary input of N ·M bits is split in N tuples of M bits. Each Discriminator
consists of multiple RAM blocks (= N), each containing 2M locations, addressed by
their respective M -bits. Tuples are connected to the binary input in a biunivocal
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pseudo-random mapping and provide the address to each RAM block. A WiSARD
system can have any number of such Discriminators and hence, any number of desired
classes.
During the training phase, all RAMs of the WNN are initialized to zero (0). The
training input is sent to each Discriminator, where the accessed RAM positions are
set to one (1). During classification, an input is sent to all Discriminators and the
Discriminator which presents the highest response is selected as representative class
for the input. The discriminator response is calculated by summing all accessed RAM
values.
The structure of WiSARD can be readily implemented in hardware using standard
SRAM memory and address decoding to provide high generalization capabilities and
real-time performance. The classification phase of WiSARD will be utilized to realize
the PUFs in this work.
4.3 Strong PUFs based on Weightless Neural Network
In this section, we present a Strong PUF design inspired by the WiSARD model
and examine some extended versions with the objective of improving the machine
learning resistance. All architectures produce a 1-bit output response, given an m-bit
input challenge.
4.3.1 WiSARD PUF
The first design is termed as WiSARD PUF and depicted in Figure 4.1. It is
composed of a single Discriminator containing multiple RAM blocks. The input is a
challenge string, which is sliced in a pseudo-randomic way into multiple tuples. Each
tuple forms the address of a unique RAM block, Ri, and decides the size of the block.
The 1-bit memory locations from the RAM blocks are accessed according to the input
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Figure 4.1: Example of WiSARD PUF architecture [108].
bit response is generated through the majority voting over the counter value. For
the proper majority voting functionality, an odd number of RAM blocks are required.
The challenge to tuple mapping is adapted accordingly to create odd number of RAM
blocks, as shown in Figure 4.1 where 16-bits input challenge is mapped to three 4-bit
tuples and two 2-bit tuples to complete the total of 5 RAM blocks.
The process to produce the final output response from Strong PUF is similar to
the WiSARD classification phase, that applies counting to the accessed RAM bits
instead of summing those bits as Discriminator response. Different from conventional
WiSARD, there is no training phase. The RAM blocks consist of SRAM cells whose
process variation dependence ensures to store the random values in each RAM content
when powered on, like SRAM PUFs [50,57]. Two WiSARD PUFs can have their own
random RAM contents and also pseudo-randomic mapping of challenge to tuples.
SRAMs outputs are susceptible to noise resulting in erroneous behavior upon
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Figure 4.2: Example of WiSARD PUF with fixed tuples among PUFs [108].
comprises multiple SRAM cells. Consequently, it is crucial to consider the intra-class
Hamming distance and ensure that the Strong PUF reliability is acceptable.
It is possible to have unique input-to-tuple mapping for each PUF. However, this
can prove costly in terms of actual hardware implementation as it involves imple-
menting additional circuitry to create the mapping. Multiple mapping techniques
can be used, but are considered beyond the scope of this work. For simplicity, we will
assume a case where the mapping is fixed across all WiSARD PUFs by the designer,
as presented in Figure 4.2. All subsequent architectures that will be discussed assume
a fixed mapping of the input challenge to tuples across all PUFs.
4.3.2 Extensions to WiSARD PUF architecture
Since using a WiSARD PUF with simple majority voting on the RAM block
outputs can be sufficient to create a Strong PUF, we also explore possible extensions
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Figure 4.3: Example of WiSARD PUF architecture with extra bits and tuple rotations
(circular shifts) [108].
comparison to the WiSARD PUF. In particular, we investigate to affect either the
tuple generation for addressing the RAM blocks or the output process of the blocks
in different ways to generate the final output response.
4.3.2.1 Fuzzy logic based address generation
A popular way to deal with noisy data is to harness fuzzy extractor, as evidenced
by its advantageous use in deriving stable keys from biometric data [40, 76]. Fuzzy
logic has also been extensively used to improve reliability of Weak PUF in the pres-
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ence of noise [29, 39, 80, 83]. Fuzzy extractor is usually split into enrollment and
reconstruction phases. During enrollment, helper data is created manipulating the
input data, say PUF response bits, in a trusted environment. Reconstruction as-
sumes that the received data is noisy and uses the proper helper data to retrieve the
error-free response originally used in the enrollment phase.
We utilize fuzzy extractor concepts to first generate more data from RAM blocks
than in a normal WiSARD PUF, akin to helper data generation and then, reduce
this data to obtain the final PUF response (Reconstruction). Two approaches were
utilized to affect the challenge tuples so as to collect multiple outputs from each RAM
block – (a) add extra bits in random locations to each tuple; (b) perform rotation (or
circular shift) operation on each tuple.
In extra bits approach, we add e extra bits to each tuple allowing to generate all
2e combinations of the extra bits and correspondingly, the same number of addresses
and outputs from each RAM block. All combinations can be generated internally
using a simple counter. For the second approach, the original challenge tuple is
used to obtain the output from the corresponding RAM block. Then, we perform a
predefined number of right circular shift (or rotation) operations on the tuple and
generate multiple outputs using the new addresses.
Both methods help access more of the system entropy for the same input challenge
to further help inoculate the PUF against machine learning attacks. An example for
16-bit input challenge and 2 extra bits (or 2 tuple rotations) is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Each RAM block generates 3 outputs which undergo majority voting to produce a
single output. The new outputs undergo a second majority voting process to produce
the final 1-bit response. We ensure that an odd number of inputs are utilized for the
majority voting either by performing an even number of tuple rotations, or by adding
(2e)−1 combinations of the extra bits, and using odd number of RAM blocks, similar
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Figure 4.4: Example of RM-WiSARD PUF architecture [108].
4.3.2.2 Concatenated codes based response generation
The response generation in the basic WiSARD architecture, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.1, utilizes majority voting, which is akin to using a repetition code. Other
error-correcting codes (ECC) can also be implemented for the purpose of generating
the final response from the RAM block outputs. Based on the code scheme, it is
possible to introduce a non-linear relationship between the RAM outputs and the re-
sponse, in contrast to the linear relationship exhibited by majority voting. This can
greatly benefit the machine learning resistance of the final Strong PUF. Christoph
Bösch illustrated the advantages of using concatenated error-correcting codes (ECC)
to improve Weak PUF reliability and also provided detailed hardware implementation
of various ECC schemes [29]. We employ one of the concatenated ECC schemes and
present an alteration to the basic WiSARD architecture discussed previously.
In this work, Reed-Muller (RM) code-based decoding is applied to the RAM block
outputs, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. The final response is generated by using the
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Figure 4.5: Example of RM-WiSARD PUF architecture with concatenated code (tu-
ple rotations)[108].
as the RM-WiSARD architecture. The RM decoder used in our design accepts an
input of length 2m and generates an (m + 1)-bit output. The decoder is referred to
as RM(1,m) Decoder. The architecture is changed to contain 2m RAM blocks to
produce the necessary outputs. The Hadamard transform algorithm is implemented
by the decoder with a simple modification to extract a final code of odd length. A
Reed-Muller decoder hardware implementation scales with the chosen value of m and
has been detailed by Christoph Bösch [29].
RM-WiSARD implementation can be further modified to utilize extra bits or tuple
rotations, similar to basic WiSARD architecture. The RM decoder is appropriately
modified to accommodate the final PUF response generation. Figure 4.5 illustrates
an example of the RM-WiSARD implementation where repetition code is applied to
the outputs from tuple rotation of each RAM block. Then, the results are passed
to the RM decoder which produces an output with odd number of bits. We use the
repetition code again to get the final 1-bit response, as desired.
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4.4 WNN PUF - Experimental Setup and Results
In this section, we evaluate the proposed designs in Section 4.3 to identify which
one can provide the highest machine learning resistance. We also analyse the inter-
class (uniqueness) and intra-class (reliability) Hamming distance metrics to further
compare and contrast the suitability of various designs as Strong PUFs.
4.4.1 Setup
All PUF experiments are simulated in Python and the relevant SRAM circuit
data is obtained from SPICE simulations using 45 nm transistor models [6]. Each
PUF receives a 64-bit input challenge to produce a 1-bit response. The Discriminator
SRAM cells of each PUF instance are filled with the random power-on states such
that the average number of 1’s and 0’s are equal. The general details about the
WNN designs are tabulated in Table 4.1. For designs that have 9 RAM blocks, 7 are
addressed by 8-bit tuples while the remaining two use 4-bit tuples. The extended
address generation designs assume 2 extra bits and 2 rotations for the respective
implementations. All RM-WiSARD PUF design variants utilize the RM(1, 3) decoder
for response generation. Except original WiSARD PUF, all the designs assume a fixed
input-to-tuple mapping across PUFs, as depicted in Figure 4.2.
4.4.2 Uniqueness
Uniqueness is a property wherein each PUF generates different responses com-
pared to the others PUFs for the same challenge. Inter-class Hamming distance
(HD) is the metric used to determine uniqueness. We calculate the Hamming dis-
tances between the responses of each pair of PUFs for the same challenge and average
the results over many challenges and PUF instances. The average of inter-class HD,
















WiSARD PUF 9 7 · 28 + 2 · 24 1, 824
WiSARD PUF
(fixed tuple)
9 7 · 28 + 2 · 24 1, 824
RM-WiSARD PUF 8 8 · 28 2, 048
WiSARD PUF + 2
Extra bits
9 7 · 210 + 2 · 26 7, 296
WiSARD PUF + 2
rotations
9 7 · 28 + 2 · 24 1, 824
RM-WiSARD PUF
+ 2 Extra bits
8 8 · 210 8, 192
RM-WiSARD PUF
+ 2 rotations
8 8 · 28 2, 048
where k is amount of PUFs, n is the total of bit responses and HD(ri, rj) is Hamming
distance between responses of the PUF instances i and j to a particular challenge. A
PUF is considered ideal when the normalized inter-class HD = 0.5.
For this experiment, (k =) 1000 PUF instances were evaluated for each design,
(n =) 1000 challenges were applied to each PUF to produce the total of 1000 response
bits. Table 4.2 summarizes the uniqueness results for the several PUF designs.
We notice that every designs have the mean close to the ideal 0.5 and the original
WiSARD PUF (random input-to-tuple mapping) resulted in the highest normalized
HD. Considering the extended tuple generation designs, the tuple rotation offered
better results in comparison to extra bits scheme. Lastly, while we consider fixed
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input-to-tuple mapping for the majority voting of the WiSARD PUF variants, it may
be beneficial to explore efficient random challenge mapping in hardware in order to
extract greater uniqueness from the system.
4.4.3 Reliability
Reliability is the PUF property to produce the correct response given the same
challenges even in the presence of noise. Intra-class Hamming distance is the metric
used to evaluate reliability. We calculate the intra-class HD by extracting the correct
responses (ri) from a PUF under ideal conditions and obtain a set (m) of noisy re-
sponses (r′i) by introducing errors in RAM locations across multiple power-ons. Then,
the Hamming distance between the correct and the noisy responses for each challenge
is performed. An ideal PUF should have intra-class HD = 0 for any challenge, rep-











where n is the number of CRPs collected from each PUF and HD(ri, r
′
i,t) is Hamming
distance between responses of the right PUF instance i and its t-th noisy instance to
a particular challenge.
To simulate the noisy conditions, we consider that each SRAM cell has an em-
bedded inherent error rate across multiple power-ons. Roel Maes introduced hetero-
geneous error modeling with cell-specific error probabilities to evaluate the reliability
of PUFs with high accuracy [79]. We utilized the proposed 2-parameter error model
to assign the error rates to our SRAM cells. 10, 000 SRAM cells were simulated in
45 nm CMOS technology [6] in the presence of thermal noise and the error rates for
each instance were obtained across 1000 power-ons. The data was curve-fitted to
obtain the relevant parameters, found to be λ1 = 0.2916 and λ2 = 1.9062. Utilizing
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the methodology proposed by Maes [79], we can generate error rates for an arbitrary
number of SRAM cells that will constitute the WNN PUFs.
The WiSARD PUF designs are simulated to obtain the responses across multi-
ple power-ons applying the same challenges. For each design, 100 PUF instances
were analyzed where each one received (n =) 1000 challenges and for each challenge
(m =) 100 noisy responses were generated by simulating multiple power-ons for the
SRAM cells. Table 4.2 presents the reliability results for the various PUF designs. We
notice that the original WiSARD PUF performs better than all the other variants.
Furthermore, in the extended tuple generation designs, the extra bits offered better
reliability in comparison to tuple rotation scheme, in contrast with the uniqueness
results. Possibly, utilizing different processing schemes for the RAM block outputs
can further improve reliability. Those schemes will be targeted in the future works.
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4.4.4 Machine Learning Resistance
Popular techniques like Logistic Regression (LR) and Support Vector Machine
(SVM) have demonstrated the ability to model previous digital Strong PUF designs
[107]. Sophisticated machine learning (ML) based on ensemble meta-algorithms, like
Gradient Boosting, were shown to break even analog Strong PUFs, that were initially
resistant to SVM, by Vijayakumar et al.[125]. In this work, we consider LR, SVM
and Gradient Boosting (Grad Boost) to measure the attack resilience of the proposed
designs.
The machine learning algorithms were implemented in Python using the scikit-
learn tools [9]. Gradient Boosting was configured with the number of estimators
set at 128 and learning rate of 0.01. For LR, we set the inverse of the regularization
strength to a value of 10−5. SVM utilizes radial basis function (RBF) kernel machines
to model non-linearly separable functions as linearly separable in higher dimensions.
We analyze 100 PUF instances for each design and collect 150, 000 CRPs for each
PUF instance of which 100, 000 CRPs were used for training to obtain the cloned
PUF model and 50, 000 CRPs were applied for testing the machine learning accuracy.
An ideal Strong PUF will have machine learning accuracy of 50 %, which is akin to
random guessing.
The mean and standard deviation of machine learning accuracy obtained through
discussed ML algorithms for each PUF architecture are tabulated in Table 4.3. Gra-
dient Boosting offered the best learning accuracy and all RM-WiSARD PUF variants
showed high machine learning resistance across the various learning algorithms with
’RM-WiSARD PUF with Tuple rotation’ providing the best results. We also observed
that applying extra bits or tuple rotation modifications to the original WiSARD PUF
worsened the mean modeling attack resistance for those PUFs. However, these results
were generated for a fixed challenge-to-tuple mapping. It is possible that changing
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µ σ µ σ µ σ
WiSARD PUF 0.79 0.016 0.690 0.020 0.637 0.246
WiSARD PUF
(fixed tuple) 0.790 0.017 0.687 0.026 0.630 0.032
RM-WiSARD
PUF
0.612 0.028 0.585 0.01 0.583 0.048
WiSARD PUF
+ Extra bits
0.815 0.018 0.722 0.028 0.652 0.033
WiSARD PUF
+ Tuple rotation








0.594 0.011 0.584 0.008 0.584 0.008
this mapping may affect the distribution of accuracies across the variants of WiSARD
PUF. However, the mapping was not one of the control variables in our experiments.
4.4.5 Hardware Analysis
As all presented the designs in Section 4.3 integrate a Weightless Neural Network
hardware and extra resources for concatenated code and fuzzy logic versions, the
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main resource costs originate from the number of SRAM cells, area cost of final
response bit generation and challenge-to-tuple mapping. The fixed mapping, shown
in Figure 4.2, can be achieved with minimal resources and most designs require ≤ 2K
SRAM bits aside from extra-bits schemes which require large number of SRAM bits,
as seen in Table 4.1. Unit SRAM cell size of 0.346µm2 , quoted by Intel [89], in
45 nm technology node gives us an area of 710µm2 for 2K SRAMs with additional
area coming from interface circuitry. If an IC has the option of also utilizing the
WNN for neural network applications, then we can amortize their resource costs
over both applications. Reed-Muller decoder hardware implementation detailed by
Bösch [29] achieved 248.976µm2 area for RM(1, 3) and the repetition code decoder
31.92 µm2 area, both costs determined by 45 nm standard cell library [5]. These
resources represent a small overhead in comparison to the size of the RAM blocks
and further reduction can be achieved by sharing decoder hardware and serializing
the PUF operation.
4.5 Reliable Strong PUF Implementation
In this section, we explore the construction of a Strong PUF using reliable Weak
PUFs as the initial entropy source and combining them with Weightless Neural Net-
works (WNNs), using the WiSARD model. Further, we explore alterations to the
basic WNN architecture, presented in Section 4.3, with the intention of improving
the machine learning resistance of the Strong PUF. All presented architectures pro-
duce a 1-bit output response, given an m-bit input challenge.
4.5.1 Reliable Weak PUF Entropy Source
To construct a reliable Strong PUF, we utilize Weak PUFs as the sources of
entropy in the PUF system. Such an approach allows us to harness the extensive



















Figure 4.6: Reliable Strong PUF implementation
Using potent Weak PUF designs [96], robust error correction mechanisms [126] and
techniques such as accelerated aging and masking [85] allows us to create a highly
reliable binary string (or secret key) from an array of Weak PUFs. Such a binary
string represents the process variation dependence of the final Strong PUF design and
is unique to each IC.
In this work, we seek to find the smallest length of the binary string required for
creating a Strong PUF that possesses high uniqueness and machine learning resis-
tance. Having a smaller entropy source results in smaller area for the Strong PUF.
For our work, we study the case where we have 256, 128, 64 or 32 initial reliable Weak
PUF bits that will be used to fill the WNN RAM cells.
4.5.2 Complete Strong PUF architecture
The complete Strong PUF implementation requires that the RAM contents be
filled with the reliable Weak PUF bits in an equi-probable manner to reduce bias
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in the system. For example, if there are 210 total RAM locations in the WNN and
we obtain 28 reliable bits from Weak PUFs, then each bit needs to be randomly
mapped to 210/28 (= 4) unique locations. The random mapping can be implemented
in hardware by either using a crossbar network or hard-wiring each Weak PUF bit to
the appropriate RAM cell.
The complete Strong PUF, as illustrated in Figure 4.6, assumes a 256-bit register
is used to store the Weak PUF bits. The register itself obtains its data from an
initial number of reliable Weak PUFs, ranging from 32 to 256 bits. When considering
smaller number of initial reliable bits, we make the relevant number of copies to get
a total of 256 bits. The contents of the register are, then, used to load the WNN
RAM locations. The WNN processes the input challenges to produce the final 1-bit
response.
4.6 Reliable Strong PUF - Experimental Setup and Results
In this section, we evaluate the proposed reliable designs discussed in Section 4.5
to find out how the size of the initial entropy source in the form of reliable Weak PUF
bits influences the Strong PUF machine learning resistance and uniqueness. Next, we
provide an analysis of the results with the purpose of identifying the minimum entropy
source size that can provide higher machine learning resistance and high uniqueness.
Since in Section 4.5 the Weak PUFs have high reliability, for these experiments we
consider all architectures with 100% reliability.
4.6.1 Setup
All PUF experiments in this section are simulated in Python and the relevant
SRAM circuit parameters are obtained from SPICE simulations using 45 nm transistor
models [6]. Each PUF receives a 64-bit input challenge and produces a 1-bit response.
The Discriminator SRAM cell contents are filled with the contents of the 256-bit
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Table 4.4: Reliable WiSARD PUF Architectures with 64-bit Challenges
#RAM
Blocks
# Addresses # SRAMs
WiSARD PUF 9 7 · 28 + 2 · 24 1, 824
RM-WiSARD PUF 8 8 · 28 2, 048
WiSARD PUF +
Tuple rotation
9 7 · 28 + 2 · 24 1, 824
RM-WiSARD PUF
+ Tuple rotation
8 8 · 28 2, 048
register which, in turn, is loaded by the Weak PUF entropy source, as described in
Section 4.5.2. The Weak PUFs in the entropy source are assumed to have equal
number of 1s and 0s and are unique across PUF instances.
The general details about WNN designs simulated in this section are tabulated in
Table 4.4. Note that the extra bits schemes were not included for these experiments
due to worst results discussed in Section 4.4. For designs that have 9 total RAM
blocks, 7 are addressed by 8-bit tuples while the remaining two use 4-bit tuples. The
designs with tuple rotations assume 2 rotations and both RM-WiSARD PUF design
variants utilize the RM(1, 3) decoder for response generation. Finally, all the designs
assume a fixed input-to-tuple mapping across PUFs, as depicted in Figure 4.2.
4.6.2 Uniqueness
Uniqueness was defined in Section 4.4.2. For this experiment, 100 entropy source-
to-WNN random mappings were generated for each PUF architecture. For each
instantiated Strong PUF of any architecture, (n =) 1000 challenges were applied and
(k =) 100 such instances were evaluated. The entropy size was varied to 32, 64, 128
and 256 Weak PUF bits in each PUF instance, as illustrated in Figure 4.6.
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Table 4.5: Uniqueness Standard Deviation results for PUF architectures with varying
Entropy Source sizes
PUF Type
Standard Deviation of Uniqueness
(σ)
32 64 128 256
WiSARD PUF
(fixed tuple)
0.0869 0.0586 0.0412 0.0314
RM-WiSARD PUF 0.0238 0.0194 0.0173 0.0164
WiSARD PUF +
Tuple rotation
0.1413 0.0905 0.0581 0.0417
RM-WiSARD PUF
+ Tuple rotation
0.0319 0.0222 0.0185 0.0170
The mean inter-class HD was found to be close to the ideal 0.5 ranging between
0.4661 to 0.5001 for all designs and entropy source sizes. The minimum standard
deviation results for the various PUF designs are tabulated in Table 4.5, representing
the best entropy source random mapping among the 100 generated mappings. We
observe that standard deviation decreases as the entropy source size increases in any
given design. The original RM-WiSARD PUF with a 256-bit entropy source offered
the lowest standard deviation with the mean inter-class HD of 0.4858.
4.6.3 Machine Learning Resistance
Machine Learning Resistance was defined in Section 4.4.4. In this experiment, we
use Gradient Boosting (Grad Boost) to estimate the attack resistance of the proposed
reliable designs as it consistently outperforms LR and SVM.
Gradient Boosting was implemented in Python using the scikit-learn tools [9] with
the number of estimators set at 128 and learning rate of 0.01. For each scenario, the 10
best entropy source mappings were selected from the uniqueness results, representing
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the 10 smallest standard deviations. These mappings help shortlist the candidates
for machine learning analysis and reduce the number of experiments. 150, 000 CRPs
were applied to each PUF instance out of which 100, 000 CRPs were used for training
a model with Gradient Boosting. The trained model was tested using 50, 000 CRPs to
measure the machine learning accuracy of the cloned PUF. For each selected design,
100 PUF instances were simulated.
Figure 4.7 presents the distributions of machine learning accuracies for varying
entropy sizes for the RM-WiSARD PUF implementation considering the best map-
ping of the 10 shortlisted entropy source mappings. This implementation provided
the best machine learning accuracy results compared to the other architectures. As
with the uniqueness results, an increase in the entropy source size results in decreased
machine learning accuracy and also, a smaller standard deviation. The average ma-
chine learning accuracy for each PUF architecture with varying entropy source sizes
is summarized in Table 4.6. For faster analysis, the random entropy mapping is cho-
sen for each design by considering the results from an entropy source size of 256 bits
and then, changing the size while keeping the same mapping. We see that the RM-
WiSARD PUF variants offered higher machine learning resistance than the simple
WiSARD variants. Moreover, we see that we are still able to get ≤ 65 % machine
learning accuracy by considering just 32 initial reliable Weak PUF bits. Hence, the
RM-WiSARD PUF with an entropy size of 32 can offer high machine learning resis-
tance while still exhibiting good uniqueness. This aids us in realizing a smaller Strong
PUF.
4.7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss certain aspects of our PUF implementations and also,
detail possible future improvements to the system.
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(a) Entropy size = 32 (b) Entropy size = 64
(c) Entropy size = 128 (d) Entropy size = 256
Figure 4.7: Gradient Boosting machine learning accuracy distributions for RM-
WiSARD PUF
Attack Scenario: For our work, we assume that the PUF is a black box from the
perspective of an attacker and only the PUF CRPs can be intercepted for use in model
building attacks. This requires that the designer take the necessary precautions:
ensure that RAM block contents, required in the neural network implementation, are
not accessible outside the system and prevent any data leakage from PUF system,
especially the Weak PUF bits.
Further, the black box perspective offers protection, when utilizing just 32 initial
reliable Weak PUF bits, against brute-force guessing of possible bit values. In reality,
a designer may choose to have a larger entropy source to increase security. Future
works will focus on studying the security of the PUF in case an attacker has knowledge
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Table 4.6: Gradient Boosting-based Machine Learning Accuracy for WiSARD PUF
variants
PUF Type
Machine Learning Accuracy (%)
32 64 128 256
WiSARD PUF 82.60 81.87 81.74 81.26
RM-WiSARD PUF 60.93 60.17 59.39 59.00
WiSARD PUF +
Tuple rotation
85.22 83.40 82.32 81.74
RM-WiSARD PUF
+ Tuple rotation
64.87 62.44 60.93 59.15
of the PUF architecture due to possession of a physical device. Possible fault injection
attacks will also be explored.
Hardware Implementation: One of the major resource costs for the reliable designs
is the number of WNN memory cells required. As seen from Table 4.4, the WNN
implementations require a maximum of 2K bits and the details of hardware resources
is discussed in Section 4.4.5.
The other major area intensive unit is the Weak PUF block required to generate
the reliable bits for the WNN. From Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, we can see that the RM-
WiSARD PUF architectures allow us to achieve both high uniqueness and machine
learning resistance by considering just 32 initial reliable Weak PUF bits. Using the
details provided in the work by Vijayakumar et al.[126] and assuming a 45 nm stan-
dard cell library [5], we assume the 16 : 1 mux implementation and a 5 % observable
yield loss that necessitates we use 48 (∈ 16Z) to obtain the final reliable 32 bits. This
gives us an area of ≈ 550µm2, which is significantly less than the area that the WNN
memory cells need.
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Figure 4.8: Combinational logic-based implementation of Strong PUF
We note that it is possible to use keyed hash functions, like Keccak [48], with
Weak PUF bits to obtain a Strong PUF implementation. The area for an efficient
hash implementation was found to be 2280 gate-equivalents [48] or ≈ 1900µm2 in
45 nm standard cell library [5]. To make a comparison with our designs, the area
needed to generate the initial stable Weak PUF bits can be considered necessary
to both the keyed hash and our PUF design and hence, excluded from comparison.
Further, as noted in Section 4.4.5, the area for the RAM-based version of our design
is highly dependent on practical implementation considerations.
An alternative PUF implementation is based on two mapping operations. The first
mapping is between the input challenge to the tuple for addressing the RAM blocks.
The second mapping is for the RAM content based on the Weak PUF entropy source.
These maps can be implemented as a 2D crossbar or as combinational logic. Figure 4.8
shows the schematic for a combinational system. The RAM Select is used for virtual
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Table 4.7: Combinational Logic implementations of PUF with varying Entropy
Sources





RAM block (Ri) selection while the specific bit is selected via Bit Select control.
Table4.7 summarizes the silicon areas, in 45 nm standard cell library [5], for varying
sizes of the entropy source. We see that the randomly mapped implementation of the
proposed Strong PUF compares favorably with the optimized Keccak design.
4.8 Conclusion
Strong PUFs have been promised to provide a low cost alternative to cryptography-
based authentication. However, unreliability in Strong PUFs can increase the number
of CRPs needed for proper authentication and low resistance against model building
attacks using machine learning techniques can create a security risk. Hence, it is ad-
vantageous to develop a Strong PUF architecture that possesses high reliability and
also, offers greater resistance to machine learning attacks. In this work, we seek to
leverage the extensive work done to obtain high reliability for Weak PUFs and inte-
gration of neural networks in hardware to create new Strong PUF designs that can
offer high reliability while maintaining high machine learning resistance and unique-
ness. This work proposes a novel Strong PUF architecture composed of WiSARD
Neural Network (WNN) and further explores variations of such a design. To obtain
greater reliability, we extend the designs by using an initial, reliable Weak PUF en-
tropy source mapped into the WNN and analyze the minimum entropy source needed
to ensure a Strong PUF. Our results show that it is possible to create highly reliable
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REALIZING ROBUST, LIGHTWEIGHT, MODELING
ATTACK RESISTANT STRONG PUFS FROM WEAK
PUFS
5.1 Introduction
Building on the work in Chapters 2 and 3, in this chapter, we propose a Strong
PUF system that utilizes reliable SRAM-based Weak PUFs as the initial entropy
source against which the states of a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR) are compared
using Hamming distance (HD) as the metric. We find the LFSR state that is closest
to the Weak PUF string, i.e. the state which yields the minimum HD. The number
of iterations, termed the index, needed by the LFSR to reach the target state from
its initial seed state is recorded as the output response. The LFSR seed state is
set by an external challenge and this, in turn, changes the observed indices for the
same Weak PUF source against different challenges. Our scheme handles a large
Weak PUF string by dividing it into substrings of the length of a smaller LFSR and
collecting a set of indices. A concatenation of these indices forms the output response
of our PUF system. We also extend our mechanism to incorporate rounds where the
response output of the first round becomes the challenge seed for the next round.
Our results show that it is possible to create a lightweight, robust key generation
system that exhibits ideal Strong PUF characteristics with respect to uniqueness and
modeling-attack resistance while maintaining the high degree of robustness offered by
the Weak PUFs. Our proposed system has small area overhead and produces large
set of responses with the same length as the initial Weak PUF string. Also, the Weak
PUF source is never exposed to unauthorized parties.
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5.2 Motivation
We have explored relevant research relating to the reliability of Weak PUFs and
on Strong PUFs with particular focus on modeling-attack resistance in Sections 2.2,
3.2 and 4.2. In this section, we briefly discuss the motivation for this work.
Paral and Devadas proposed a pattern matching key generation (PMKG) scheme
that could alleviate the effects of noise on PUF outputs without the need for error
correction codes, while providing a strong key that does not expose the PUF bits.
Pattern matching is done using Hamming distance (HD). The initial PUF output
is divided into substrings which are accessed based on input challenge. A substring
is associated with an index and a set of indices are used to generate the final key
while the PUF substrings are stored as helper data to aid in error correction [94].
Komano et al.proposed a more optimized PMKG solution offering greater security
[68]. However, these PMKG schemes have significant area overheads and storage
requirements for auxiliary data to produce a robust key.
Our goal is to utilize the lightweight hardware-based Weak PUF reliability en-
hancements to generate an initial set of robust bits. Then, we utilize the concepts
from the previously discussed PMKG schemes to design a system that can utilize the
robust Weak PUF bits and produce secure responses to input challenges without ex-
posing the initial Weak PUF bits. We show that it is possible to implement a reliable
and secure Strong PUF that is also lightweight compared to previous designs. Also,
our design takes an n-bit input challenge and produce an n-bit output response.
5.3 Proposed Method
In this section, we will first explore the basic implementation of the LFSR-based
key generation system. Based on this foundation, we will next discuss various modi-
fications and extensions to the system to make it more robust in terms of security.
79
Figure 5.1: Illustration of the basic key generation system
5.3.1 Basic System
Figure 5.1 illustrates the operation of a basic LFSR-based key generation system
with an initial n-bit Weak PUF entropy source. An m-bit Galois LFSR (m <= n) is
used to generate the various states used for comparison with the Weak PUF entropy
source. We record all the shift registers in the LFSR to produce the m-bit output or
state per cycle. Using a smaller LFSR necessitates that the PUF string be divided
into substrings of size m, which are then processed individually. For simplicity, we
assume that m is a divisor of n. The seed to the LFSR is derived from an n-bit
challenge input. Hence, multiplexers are used to select and forward the relevant
seed/PUF substring to the LFSR during operation. If the seed input to the LFSR
contains all zeros, we add 1 to the input LSB to prevent the LFSR from locking up.
Substring selection is done by the Control Unit, which also produces the clock for the
system.
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In our work, we choose a primitive polynomial, or taps, for the LFSR feedback so as
to ensure a unique output sequence of maximal length, i.e. 2m−1 states. An iteration
during operation is defined as obtaining the next m-bit LFSR state. An m-bit counter
is used to track the number of iterations and is used to obtain the index. Once the
LFSR is initialized with the seed, we obtain the next state for comparison with the
PUF substring. Also, an index register is initialized to 0. Hamming distance (HD)
between the LFSR state and the PUF substring is calculated and stored as the initial
minimum HD in an HD register. During the subsequent iterations, the calculated HD
is compared with the previously stored minimum HD and updates are made to the
stored HD and index registers if the new HD is lower. As we use a maximal-length
LFSR, the number of iterations needed to process all states is 2m − 1 and is checked
using the Last Iteration condition. Using a maximal-length LFSR allows the index to
cover the full range of values, i.e. ∈ {0, . . . , 2m− 1}. Otherwise, the LFSR states will
have a cycle length < 2m − 1, producing repeating states. Since we only update the
index when a new HD lower that the current minimum is found, the final index can
have most significant bits that are always 0. In contrast, updating the index register
whenever the calculated HD ≤ minHD introduces bias in the least significant bits as
the minimum state is likely to repeat at least once before the counter goes through
all 2m − 1 cycles. Such bias is translated to the final output, reducing the entropy in
the system.
Once each PUF substring is processed, the index output is directed towards the
Final Key register using demultiplexers. Control Unit selects the next PUF substring
and corresponding LFSR seed bits from the Challenge input. At the end of the key
generation operation, we obtain an n-bit key after processing all the substrings.
In the aforementioned design, an attacker can recover the circuitry by reverse-
engineering the hardware and figure out the taps utilized in the LFSR. Since the
LFSR is a linear system, observing the input challenge seed and the output key can
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allow the attacker to recover the initial Weak PUF bits, breaking the system. Even
without hardware reverse-engineering, an attacker might be able to figure out the
LFSR taps using the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm by just observing the inputs and
outputs to the system. Hence, we need to modify our basic design to improve its
robustness.
5.3.2 Key Generation with Rounds
A simple modification is to perform multiple rounds of the entire operation by
using the key generated from one round as the input challenge in the next. The
final output key will have a significantly high degree of non-linearity regarding its
relationship with the initial Weak PUF entropy source and input challenge. Such re-
cursive operations have been proven to be highly advantageous in the implementation
of many cryptographic functions, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). In
such a case, the challenge input register can be re-used to store the key from the
current round for the next round. For example, in the first round, once a particular
challenge substring has been processed, the resulting index output can be written
back to the location of that challenge substring. This allows us to save area needed
for additional registers.
5.3.3 Tap Selection
The first possible modification is to introduce the ability to change the taps of
the LFSR. An LFSR can have multiple primitive polynomials or tap selections that
results in maximal length sequences and the order of states is unique to a sequence.
Hence, we can choose between the polynomials based on certain conditions to realize
different LFSRs. The LFSR is suitably modified to allow for such an operation. Given
our goal that the initial Weak PUF entropy source bits should not be exposed to the
outside world when a device is being authenticated, these secret bits can be used as
inputs to a selection function that chooses one of the maximal-length LFSR taps.
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of the LFSR tap selection system
Hence, the LFSR behavior is now dependent on the system’s secret and an attacker
would have to guess the Weak PUF bits to find out the taps used in the LFSR,
increasing the complexity of the attack. We note that the tap selection is specific to
the PUF substring and does not change with respect to any other input. We term
this as a static tap selection.
For the basic system described in Section 5.3.1, Figure 5.2 illustrates how we
implement the tap selection system for m = 8. An 8-bit LFSR has 16 primitive
polynomials. We take the first 4 bits (or nibble) and the last 4 bits of the 8-bit PUF
substring and process them by performing bitwise exclusive OR operation to get a
4 bit output. Thus, we need 4 XOR gates in hardware. This becomes the input to
the selection function, represented by a multiplexer array. The 8 bit output of this
function sets the taps of the LFSR for that particular 8-bit PUF substring.
While the aforementioned tap selection process is static with respect to the input
of a particular round, it is possible to make it dynamic by making the tap selection
83
input dependent on both the PUF substring and the input seed substring. As we
perform rounds, the input seed changes and hence, will influence the selected taps
for a particular substring. Here, the PUF substring can be considered as providing
the secret static offset to the tap selection input. We process the seed substring in
the same manner as in Figure 5.2 to get a 4-bit string which is then combined with
the 4-bit string obtained from the PUF substring to get the final tap selection input.
Hence, we will need 12 (or 3 sets of 4) XOR gates in total to realize the dynamic tap
selection.
5.3.4 Coupling the Index output and Seed
Another possible modification is to perform bitwise exclusive or operation between
the m-bit index output from processing one PUF substring and the m-bit LFSR seed
input used for processing the next selected PUF substring. This affects the next
substring’s index output as the initial state of the LFSR is changed compared to
using the initial seed bits directly. The attacker will need to know the order of PUF
substring selection and then, work their way backwards. Combined with tap selection
and employing multiple rounds, this increase the attack complexity significantly by
introducing significant interdependence between the output bits.
The selection sequence of the next PUF substring to process during a given round
can be set by the designer. In this work, we analyze two types of selection sequences.
5.3.4.1 Consecutive Selection
The simplest sequence is to select consecutive PUF substrings for processing. For
the round-based scheme, the output of the last substring processed in a particular
round influences the seed utilized for the first substring selected in the next round.
In the first round, the seed for processing the first substring is taken directly from
the challenge inputs as there is no previous index output to use.
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5.3.4.2 AES-type Selection
We explore an alternate selection scheme to see if the byte selection order has an
effect on the PUF metrics. In particular, the byte selection order of the ShiftRows step
of the AES is used as a reference. In a 128-bit AES, 16 bytes need to be processed in a
round. If the bytes are numbered as {0, 1, 2, . . . , 15}, then we can use (5.1) to produce
the necessary byte sequence in any round. Each round will select all 16 bytes in a
unique order. Such an approach has the advantage of the selection sequence changing
in each round compared to consecutive selection.
selecti+1 = (selecti + 1 + round ∗ 4) mod 16 (5.1)
where selecti+1 indicates the next substring to choose based on the current substring
selecti and the round number (∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }). The pattern generated in a particular
round repeats every 4 rounds.
For processing 8 substrings, (5.1) can be modified by replacing 16 with 8 and 4
with 2. This will also have a 4 rounds cycle.
5.3.5 Multi-word Entropy Source
Previously, both the input challenge and the initial Weak PUF entropy source
were considered to be of the same length, n bits. Now, we consider a case where
the entropy source affords us a larger number of bits than the input challenge such
that we can split the entropy source into multiple n-bit words, as shown in Figure 5.3.
This allows us to select a different word from the entropy source in each consecutive
round, further increasing the complexity for an attacker. If we can split the entropy
source into k n-bit words, then it is possible to use an n-bit input challenge to create
n× k-bit output key in k rounds while utilizing the entire entropy source instead of
having to re-use it as in the case of basic system with rounds. We can also output a
regular n-bit key after each round if so desired.
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of the key generation system with Multi-word Entropy Source
5.4 Experimental Setup and Results
In this section, we describe the PUF system specifications used for generating
the results. Next, we analyze the results from implementation and simulation of our
system with respect to uniqueness and modeling attack resistance.
5.4.1 Setup
In this work, we first assume that the initial Weak PUF entropy source can produce
(n =) 64 reliable bits. We utilize an (m =) 8-bit Galois LFSR to generate the
states for Hamming distance (HD) comparison. So, the 64-bit initial Weak PUF
and input challenge strings are divided into 8 8-bit sub-strings. Using a maximal-
length/primitive polynomial provides us with 255 unique states and there are 16 such
polynomials that can be utilized. The mapping function, as described in Section 5.3.3,
takes a 4-bit input to select among the 16 possible tap combinations and outputs one
such combination as an 8-bit vector to configure the LFSR.
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For utilizing rounds-based scheme, as described in Section 5.3.2, we chose to con-
sider a total of 4 rounds and record the outputs at the end of each round as a possible
key for a particular challenge input. This allows us to analyze the effect of rounds on
the PUF metrics. For all the analyzed design schemes, we perform the round-based
operation. Consequently, the results for the first round will represent a design that
does not use rounds.
For the results, the basic system, describe in Section 5.3.1, is termed as Basic.
The byte selection schemes detailed in 5.3.4 are studied with the consecutive selec-
tion scheme termed as Consec and the AES-based scheme termed as AESshift in the
results. For the byte selection schemes, we include the static tap selection modifica-
tion, as discussed in Section 5.3.3 as part of the design. For the Consec variant, we
also explore using dynamic tap selection, described in Section 5.3.3, instead of static
selection and call this variant Consec DynTap in the results.
5.4.1.1 Multi-word Entropy Source
For the case of a PUF system with a multi-word entropy source, as shown in
Figure 5.3, we consider the sizes of the input challenge and a word to be n = 32.
This allows us to analyze how our design scales compared to the 64-bit version. The
value of k ∈ {1, 2, 4} allows us to create keys with (n × k) ∈ {32, 64, 128} bits,
respectively. For brevity, we analyze this design for the consecutive selection scheme
with dynamic taps. We obtain results for k + 1 rounds and concatenate the results
as necessary to obtain the final key. The rest of the parameters remain the same as
for the aforementioned 64-bit design.
5.4.2 Attack Scenario
For our work, we assume that the attacker has knowledge of the PUF system
design, but does not know the Weak PUF bits. Information about the Weak PUFs is
only known to the authentication agent and can only be accessed once, during post-
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manufacturing PUF testing. So, a man-in-the-middle type attacker has to rely on
using machine learning algorithms to try and guess the internal Weak PUF bits using
the observed challenge-response pairs (CRPs). Additionally, we assume the attacker
can feed challenges to the system and observe the responses.
5.4.3 Uniqueness
Uniqueness is a property wherein, for the same challenge, each PUF generates
unique responses compared to others PUFs. Inter-class Hamming distance (HD) is
used for determining uniqueness. We calculate the Hamming distances between the
responses of a pair of PUFs for the same challenge and average the results over many
challenges and all possible PUF instance pairs. The average of inter-class HD, dinter,











where s is number of PUFs, t is the total number of 64-bit responses and HD(ri, rj)
is Hamming distance between responses of the PUF instances i and j to a particular
challenge. A PUF is considered ideal when the normalized inter-class HD = 0.5 or
50 %.
For this work, (s =) 1000 64-bit strings were randomly generated and designated
as the initial Weak PUF entropy source utilized in 1000 Strong PUF instances for each
design variant considered. A set of 1000 (= t) challenges were randomly generated and
applied across all PUFs. Hence, each PUF produces a total of 1000 64-bit responses.
For the purpose of analysis, we consider two uniqueness metrics. As we generate
a 64-bit response string for each challenge, first we calculate the string uniqueness
between pairs of response strings by performing bitwise exclusive-or operation on
the strings. Next, we consider the bitwise uniqueness by considering each bit of a
response separately to obtain 64 values representing the uniqueness metric for each
bit. Then, we analyze the uniqueness of each bit individually across all challenges
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Table 5.1: String Uniqueness Mean (%) for 64-bit Strong PUF design variants
Round 1 Round 2 Round 4
Basic 50.09 49.87 49.88
Consec 49.98 49.99 49.99
AESshift 49.98 49.99 49.99
Consec DynTap 49.99 50.01 50.02
and the entire PUF population. The bitwise uniqueness provides a fine-grained metric
that can highlight potential biases in our PUF system by mirroring such biases in the
bit positions.
Table 5.1 tabulates the normalized string uniqueness results, obtained using (5.2),
for the first, second and last rounds. These results show that our basic design and all
variants maintain a close to ideal inter-class HD across multiple rounds for a 64-bit
signature response. Bitwise uniqueness, as illustrated in Figure 5.4, represents the
normalized average inter-class HD for each bit in the selected rounds. The Basic
design experienced a greater variation across bit positions compared to other design
variants in the first round. Subsequent rounds served to smooth the variations closer
to the ideal value of 50 %. The design variants were able to produce all bits with the
same uniqueness across all rounds. Hence, we conclude that it is desirable to use a
minimum of two rounds and that our design variants can realize a Strong PUF with
high uniqueness.
5.4.3.1 Multi-word Entropy Source
For the 32-bit input challenge PUF system with varying k, as described in section
5.4.1.1, we generate 1000 keys of size = {32, 64, 128} using 1000 randomly generated
32-bit input challenges. The population of PUFs is 1000 for each case.
The bitwise uniqueness results, as shown in Figure 5.5, show that our proposed
design produces a normalized uniqueness close to the ideal value of 50 % across all bit
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Figure 5.4: Bitwise Uniqueness across select Rounds
positions. Furthermore, for the case of k = 1 where the final key is of the same length
as the input challenge (32-bit), we observe that our design scales well compared to
the 64-bit PUF system described previously.
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(a) Source = 32 bits
(b) Source = 64 bits
(c) Source = 128 bits
Figure 5.5: Bitwise Uniqueness for PUF with 32-bit Challenge and varying Entropy
Source sizes
5.4.4 Machine Learning Accuracy
Popular techniques like Logistic Regression (LR) and Support Vector Machine
(SVM) have demonstrated the ability to model previous digital Strong PUF designs
[107]. However, they fail to target more resilient designs.
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5.4.4.1 Gradient Boosting
Sophisticated machine learning (ML) based on ensemble meta-algorithms, like
Gradient Boosting, were shown to provide significantly better machine learning ac-
curacy by Vijayakumar et al.[125] and Santiago et al.[109]. Boosting algorithms it-
eratively learn several weak classifiers and assign weights to them based on their
performance in terms of learning accuracy. This helps build the final strong classifier.
Once a weak classifier has been weighted and assigned towards the final classifier,
the misclassified datapoints are given higher priority while correct ones have lowered
priority. Hence, future classifiers will focus on the misclassified points. With each
iteration, the final classifier is strengthened and the prediction accuracy increases
significantly.
Furthermore, the work by Ganji [44] has shown that Boosting algorithms can
efficiently achieve probably approximately correct (PAC) learning of PUFs without
explicit knowledge of their mathematical model. Hence, in this work we consider only
Gradient Boosting as the primary choice for an attacker to clone the PUF.
The Gradient Boosting algorithm was implemented in Python using the scikit-
learn [9] and lightgbm [14] tools . Gradient Boosting was configured with the number
of estimators set at 200 and learning rate of 0.01. Since we have a 64-bit response
output, we build 64 machine learning models to separately attack each bit. This is
due to the fact that the full 64-bit response cannot be analyzed by current machine
learning algorithms as this involves the algorithm being able to build a model that
can output 264 possible classes during Training, which is infeasible.
We create a subset of 100 instance from the 1000 Weak PUF instances used in
Section 5.4.3. For each design, we collect 150, 000 CRPs for each PUF instance of
which 100, 000 CRPs were used for training to obtain the cloned PUF model and
50, 000 CRPs were utilized for testing to obtain the machine learning accuracy. We
obtain the accuracy metric for each bit position using the cloned model and the testing
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Figure 5.6: Machine Learning accuracy statistics for 4 rounds
CRP set. Hence, we get 64 distributions of accuracies over the entire population of
PUFs considered for each design variant. Furthermore, such metrics are obtained
separately for each round. An ideal Strong PUF will have a bitwise machine learning
accuracy with a distribution possessing µ = 50 % and σ = 0, which represents a truly
random entropy system.
As shown in Figure 5.6, we see that the Basic design variant performs the worst
across all bits and across rounds in terms of the mean and standard deviation ob-
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served. All variants perform poorly for the first 8-bit substring processed in the first
round. This illustrates that the coupling mechanism, described in Section 5.3.4, is
crucial to ensure greater security as the first substring in the first round does not
couple with any prior output. The order of byte selection is shown to not have an ad-
verse effect of PUF metrics. Also, we note that we need to perform a minimum of two
rounds to get close to the ideal machine learning accuracy metrics across all response
bits. Particularly, we should not expose the response from the first round during
authentication due to low ML resilience. We note that performing more rounds does
not adversely affect the accuracy of the obtained response. Hence, to further improve
security, the system can output the responses from every two rounds instead of every
round. This will prevent an attacker from gleaning any useful information by trying
to correlate the responses across rounds as they will be missing the responses from
intermediate rounds.
5.4.4.2 Multi-word Entropy Source
Similar to the 64-bit PUF system, we consider a population of 100 PUFs each for
32-bit input challenge designs with varying Weak PUF entropy sizes ∈ {32, 64, 128}.
We collect 150K keys, of which 100K are used for training and 50K are used for testing.
Gradient Boosting was used a the machine learning algorithm and the parameters
remain the same as for the 64-bit version.
The simulations were run for k + 1 rounds to ensure that we can skip recording
the output of the first round due to its greater susceptibility to attack, as discussed
in section 5.4.4. The bitwise machine learning accuracy results are presented in Fig-
ure 5.7. We see that the normalized mean and standard deviation of the accuracy
distribution for the designs with varying entropy sizes remains close to the ideal of
50 % and and 0, respectively. Hence, our design performs well regardless of the size
of the input challenge or the entropy source.
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(a) Source = 32 bits
(b) Source = 64 bits
(c) Source = 128 bits
Figure 5.7: Machine Learning Accuracy for PUF with 32-bit Challenge and varying
Entropy Source sizes
5.4.4.3 Neural Network (NN) Attacks
Multiple recent works have focused on using Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) based
neural networks to successfully attack PUFs, especially n-XOR PUFs [20, 22, 58, 90,
110]. The work by Mursi et al.[90] was able to reduce both the number of CRPs
required and the training times by more than an order of magnitude each while
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achieving ≥ 98 % accuracy for upto 9-XOR PUF. Furthermore, the authors proposed
an architecture where the number of neurons varies based on the number of PUFs
being XOR’ed (n-XOR).
In this work, we utilize the 5-layer (3 hidden layers) neural network proposed by
Mursi et al.[90] to attack the 64-bit Consec DynTap design variant utilizing a 64-bit
entropy source. For this purpose, we simulated 10 such PUFs and collected 4 million
CRPs each. In particular, we focused on the responses from Round 2 as our primary
outputs for analysis. 64 separate models are generated to attack each PUF response
bit. We utilize the parameters recommended for 9-XOR PUFs [90] while setting the
number of epochs to 200. The total CRP dataset size is varied by 1, 2 and 4 million
and we set training to test dataset ratio to 9 : 1.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the average mean and standard deviation of the accuracy
across all 64 PUF response bits, across the population and for the various dataset
sizes. The results show that our PUF design is still resilient with 4 million CRPs
being exposed. In practice, since we do not need to store the CRPs in a database
server, the attacker needs to spend time to collect such a large population of CRPs
and hence, expend considerable resources for a single device under attack.
5.4.5 Hardware Implementation
The 64-bit design variants were synthesized using 45 nm Nangate open cell library
[5] to obtain the area. Consec variant resulted in the smallest implementation with
≈ 750µm2 as it does not have the complex byte selection sequence generation require-
ment like the AESshift variant. Adding the necessary sequence generation and extra
control circuitry results in an area ≈ 850µm2 for the AESshift variant. Furthermore,
the core circuitry involving the LFSR, tap selection and Hamming Distance calcula-
tion only takes up ≈ 30 % of the total area, with the rest needed for control and data
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Figure 5.8: Learning Accuracy metrics for Neural Network Attack on 64-bit Con-
sec DynTap PUF design variant
movement/storage. Hence, these areas represent the overhead needed to implement
a Strong PUF given a set of stable Weak PUF bits.
For comparison with alternate key generation schemes, a keyed hash, such as
Keccak [48], would require 2280 gate-equivalents or ≈ 1900µm2. Additionally, the
area overhead for the 64-bit entropy source variant of the weightless neural network
(WNN) based PUF design by Santiago et al.[109] is quoted as ≈ 2060µm2. Hence,
we see that our system is comparably lightweight and can be easily implemented in
resource-constrained devices.
The quoted area numbers do not include the area needed to generate the initial
stable Weak PUF bits, as this area is dependent on the mechanisms implemented to
increase PUF reliability. However, as an example, the lowest area for a robust 128-bit
Weak PUF key quoted by Patil et al.is ≈ 824µm2 [96]. For such a system, our design




Once the input challenge is available, it can be divided into 8 substrings for pro-
cessing. For each substring, we need 255 iterations to fully cover all possible states of
the maximal-length LFSR and find the index with the minimum HD, as described in
Section 5.3.1. We utilize an additional cycle for selecting the next pair of challenge
input/PUF substrings to process and to perform the tap selection. In this cycle,
we also write the obtained 8-bit index output back to the correct location in the
input register for use in later rounds as we reuse the input register. Hence, we need
8 ∗ 256 = 2048 cycles to process one round. From our results, we see that we need to
perform a minimum of 2 rounds and so, the latency for obtaining a response from our
system is 4096 cycles. From performing a timing analysis on our implementations in
45 nm Nangate open cell library [5], we find that the fastest clock we can use is 1 GHz.
Including the time to shift in the 64-bit challenge and shift out the 64-bit response
serially, we can obtain a response every ≈ 4.25µs. Using more rounds increase the
time linearly. This translates to a throughput of ≈ 15 Mbps.
It is possible to reduce the latency further by utilizing two 8-bit LFSRs where
each LFSR processed a set of 4 substrings in a round. This reduces the number
of cycles/round by half. However, we note that we trade latency for greater area
overhead from the LFSRs and additional control circuitry required.
For the 32-bit input challenge PUF design with a multi-word entropy source, it
is possible to output the responses of each round (except the first) for the case of
k > 1 as the entropy source is different in each round. We need 4 ∗ 256 = 1024 cycles
to process one round. Including the time required for serially shifting in the 32-bit
challenge and shifting out a 32-bit response from each round, we get a throughput
of ≈ 26 Mbps. For generating larger keys, we need to wait to record outputs from
k rounds to obtain the final key. However, if we transmit the output of each round
(except first) as a partial key, we can maintain the higher throughput.
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5.5 Conclusion
Strong PUFs have shown potential for providing a low cost alternative to cryptography-
based authentication for application in resource-constrained devices. However, unre-
liability in Strong PUFs is of great concern as this can increase the number of CRPs
needed for proper authentication, especially in the presence of millions of devices.
Also, low modeling attack resistance can pose a significant security risk due to the
large attack surface in applications such as IoT systems. Hence, it is desirable to
explore Strong PUF architectures that provide a high level of robustness by lever-
aging the extensively researched reliability enhancements for Weak PUFs. In this
work, we propose a Strong PUF system that utilizes an initial, robust Weak PUF
entropy source along with a pattern-matching scheme based on Hamming distance
comparisons between Weak PUF bits and the states of a linear-feedback shift register
(LFSR). We also explore variants of the basic design to increase security and achieve
close to ideal metrics in terms of uniqueness and modeling attack resistance. Our
designs are shown to be lightweight and hence, can be incorporated into a large array
of devices with varying resource constraints.
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CHAPTER 6
META-OBFUSCATION OF PHYSICAL LAYOUTS
6.1 Introduction
One area of hardware intellectual property (IP) security research, to combat IC
counterfeiting, that has received much attention is hardware obfuscation. The goal
of obfuscation is to hide the true functionality of a design. Techniques have been
proposed at various levels of design abstraction and can vary from introduction of
additional gates to lock a circuit [106] to system level techniques [31]. Obfuscation
can also involve the creation of camouflaged cells [33,101] whose function can be hard
to determine.
However, most of the design is driven by automatic place and route tools whose
algorithms can result in structural information about a circuit that can aid a reverse
engineer in forming a hypothesis about the function of the circuit. For example,
flip flops and latches can easily be identified by following clock signals and SRAM
is apparent by its regular structure. Hierarchy in chip integration can also reveal
information. Hard IP is typically confined to lower metal layers, and signals in upper
metal layers can be identified as inter-block signals. Buses or on-chip networks can
be relatively easy to identify as wide collections of wires running together between a
common set of agents.
So along with standard obfuscation certain additional processing is required to re-
duce such information leakage. With this as motivation, we propose meta-obfuscation
techniques. These are complimentary to standard obfuscation and aim to prevent
leakage of visual information to an attacker. The purpose of these techniques is to
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break any identifying features of a circuit and allow for the creation of a generic struc-
ture. Along with the obfuscation mechanisms already employed this will enhance the
security of the circuit against reverse engineering.
The salient contributions of this work are:
 We introduce a taxonomy of various visual information leakage avenues for
circuits based on standard cell design.
 We discuss custom techniques, termed meta-obfuscation, for reducing visual
information leakage.
 We explore iterative design algorithms based on the custom techniques to im-
prove the quality of meta-obfuscation.
In this chapter, we concentrate on studying the feasibility of meta-obfuscation
using a benchmark circuit as an example and do not explore the performance impact.
More complex techniques that do take timing efficiency and additional overheads into
account will be explored in future works.
6.2 Background
In this section, we will discuss research into methods for securing design IP in a
supply chain using split manufacturing. Later, hardware obfuscation techniques that
have been proposed in previous literature are discussed. We will explore hardware
obfuscation at various levels of design abstraction. Lastly, we explore relevant works
on reverse engineering of ICs.
6.2.1 Split Manufacturing
Karri et al. explore the security offered by split manufacturing and list the chal-
lenges that accompany such an approach [102]. Split manufacturing requires that the
wafers be transported from the FEOL foundry to the BEOL foundry. These wafers
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are thin and can crack or delaminate during transportation. Also, BEOL foundry
will face alignment issues that need to be addressed properly. It is also shown that
the well known heuristics used in typical floorplanning, placement and routing tools
can be used by the attacker to predict the missing BEOL connections.
6.2.2 Hardware Obfuscation
Extensive surveys on protecting hardware intellectual property (IP) have been
performed. A robust understanding of various aspects of hardware security and trust
can be obtained via the work by Tehranipoor and Wang [118]. Colombier and Bossuet
[35] provide an exhaustive survey of previous research into hardware protection. Guin
et al. [52] perform a detailed study of counterfeiting and appropriate security mea-
sures including obfuscation.
6.2.2.1 System-level obfuscation
Many reverse engineering techniques engage in component recognition. Techniques
have been proposed to increase the complexity of delineating components through
various techniques such as combining two modules or replacing entire circuit with
obfuscated equivalent [87,88,95].
Alkabani et al. [18, 19] have proposed using FSM modification to lock a chip by
obfuscating its power-up state and only the correct key unlocks the IC. Chakraborty
and Bhunia [31] propose a methodology to perform simultaneous obfuscation and
authentication of an SoC design netlist. Rajendran et al. [100] propose a solution to
secure against untrusted supply chain and trojan insertion by malicious insider at a
fabless company. The various methods of securing the design include instruction set
randomization and additional security modules in the processor pipeline. A related
application is logic encryption, where additional gates are added to the design such
that only the correct input values allow the circuit to work properly [69,106].
102
Hardware-Software co-design based security : The work by Schrittwieser et al. fo-
cuses on protecting software vendor from piracy by the creation of a strong hardware-
software binding [113]. Zheng et al. propose a scheme where they utilize PUFs for
instruction obfuscation [133]. In their scheme, each instruction is stored in memory in
two parts: the obfuscated instruction and a challenge word to the PUF device. The
PUF responses produce the actual opcode to decode the instruction within the in-
struction pipeline. Our work introduces more flexibility into the use of PUF responses
in the instruction pipeline and describes additional security considerations.
6.2.2.2 Circuit-level obfuscation
Circuit-level obfuscation methods create or modify cell libraries to hide gate func-
tions and adding non-essential structures to the design. These approaches add extra
complexity to reverse-engineering the logic.
Camouflaging of cells can be achieved through custom design to either mimic
other cells or to allow for post-manufacturing programmability to customize gate
functions. Certain companies have specialized in creating camouflaged cell libraries
[117]. Rajendran et al.[101] have studied how to efficiently deploy a small number
of camouflaged cells to maximize the hardness of reverse engineering at minimal
overhead. Filler cells may also be used for the purpose of obfuscation [32, 33]. Some
of the cells can connect to functional logic without hampering operation. This leads
to an increase in the amount of data that an attacker will need to sort through during
reverse engineering in order to extract the underlying logic.
6.2.3 Reverse Engineering
Numerous reverse engineering attacks have been showcased over the last few years
[66, 91, 114]. Moreover, support for reverse engineering by CAD tools such as Chip-
works’ ICWorks and the open-source tool Degate [112] has resulted in attackers being
able to steal IP with relative ease.
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6.3 Taxonomy of Visual Information Leakage
In this section, we will classify the various avenues for visual information leakage,
with relevant examples, that aid an attacker in reverse engineering the design. Later,
we will concentrate on the specific issues in the presence of sequential circuits.
6.3.1 Standard cell types and sizes
Fabless designers depend on using commercially available cell libraries, often from
the foundries like TSMC where the designs will be manufactured. A vast library
of standard cells with different types and sizes allow a design to be optimized for
performance, power and area. However, these libraries are also available to attackers
to assist with their reverse engineering efforts. In case a designer chooses to use
custom obfuscated cells, these can stand out allowing attacker to focus more on the
locations of these cells.
The types and sizes of cells used allow an attacker to figure out the nature of a
circuit [91]. For example, a 8 × 8 multiplier instantiated with a full Nangate 45nm
library [5] has recognizable full adder cells, as highlighted (in green) in Figure 6.1.
The number of such cells also gives an attacker clues to this circuit being a multiplier
of a particular size.
6.3.2 Size of the module
An attacker can distinguish the boundaries of a design module through various
methods like observing the interconnects in higher metal layers to identify connec-
tions between modules; the power grid, where some modules are surrounded by ring
structures; and whitespace between modules. Different design modules can have dis-
tinct sizes. This, along with other visual information, allows the attacker to formulate
hypotheses on the nature of a particular large module.
For example, comparing the sizes of an 8×8 adder (37.2µm2) and a 8×8 multiplier
(379.5µm2) instantiated using Nangate 45nm cell library [5], we see that the multiplier
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Figure 6.1: Floorplan of 8× 8 multiplier with highlighted full adders (green)
is ∼ 10× larger. This size variance can be used by an attacker to clearly recognize a
multiplier. The attacker can then focus on the particular module to infer its function.
6.3.3 Structural information
Certain designs can leak information due to the observable structure of placed
components. This includes location of certain large cells, identifiable repeating unit
blocks (SRAMs), placement of pins and so on. Also, placement algorithms used
in commercial tools can become a crucial method for extracting information about
a design. An attacker can separate the design into sub-blocks and focus effort on
understanding the function of each sub-block instead of trying to tackle the whole
design at once.
6.3.4 Routing and metal density
Automated reverse engineering tools allow an attacker to retrieve the routing and
metal density information of a design with relative ease [112]. The use of metal layers
in a design is quite well-defined, for example the topmost metal layers used for routing
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power lines. Even if the design was affected to hide placement information, routing
can be used by an attacker to identify clusters and logical neighbors in a design and
delineate the circuit into sub-blocks. Hence, it becomes crucial to address this for the
protection of a particular design.
6.3.5 Leakage in sequential circuits
6.3.5.1 Clock Paths
Typically, clock is distributed in a design via H-trees [42]. Tracing these clock
paths is one of the primary goals of an attacker as these readily identify the flip-flops,
located at the leaf nodes of the tree, in a design. Using this information, the attacker
will be able to divide the design into manageable parts for analysis. The attacker
can then apply SAT techniques [62] along with knowledge of other visual information
discussed in this section to identify the functions implemented between flip-flops.
6.3.5.2 Design for Test logic
Tracing of scan chains provides another avenue for an attacker to identify flip-
flops. Since the flip-flops on a scan chain may be accessible through the scan pins
of an IC, the attacker can use this knowledge to aid in the deciphering of a circuit’s
functionality.
6.4 Meta-obfuscation techniques
In this section, we discuss the potential solutions to address the problems discussed
in the previous section. Concentrating on a single circuit (ISCAS C432 [53]), we
illustrate the solutions to highlight the changes made for each case. We explore how
















Figure 6.2: Meta-obfuscation techniques applied to ISCAS C432 [53]
6.4.1 Standard cell types and sizes
One possible way to complement obfuscation techniques is to affect the standard
cells used in the design. It is vital to restrict the circuit to use only universal gates
(NAND, NOR and Inverter) as much as possible to make sure that the standard cells
themselves do not reveal any information. Also, constraining their sizes allows us to
visually make the cells look the same and forces an increase in reverse engineering
effort to distinguish the cells.
For the purpose of illustration, we instantiate the ISCAS C432 using the full
Nangate 45nm standard cell library [5] using Synopsys Design Compiler and carried
out placement in Cadence Encounter [1], shown in Figure 6.2a. Next, we re-compiled
the design and restricted the standard cells to universal gates and of comparable sizes
(especially for the inverter). The design placement was carried out again, as shown
in Figure 6.2b.
However, just the use of universal gates may not be enough to protect the design.
We still need to address the presence of structural information. Also, in case a designer
needs to utilize more cell types, we need to address this through the usage of dummy
cells. These issues will be dealt with in detail below.
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6.4.2 Size of the module
Certain obfuscation techniques allow us to affect the size of a module by combining
it with other neighboring modules [95]. Most other techniques can also incur an
increase the design area. Scaling the design further may prove beneficial as it allows
us the flexibility to institute further changes. Additionally, depending on the nature
of scaling we can affect the module’s shape. This can prove useful by making the
current design look similar to its larger neighbors. Affecting the size of the module
incurs the most expense in terms of design resources.
For our purpose, we expanded C432 by a 100% in the y-direction changing its
shape. We need to account for the standard cell height during expansion for proper
placement of cells by the tools. The new module, with the cell locations also scaled,
is shown in Figure 6.2c.
While affecting the size of the module may prove useful, we still need to account
for the placement tool behavior which may introduce certain structural information
that can still aid the attacker.
6.4.3 Structural information
To account for the issues discussed in section 6.3.3, we systematically modify a
design placement to make it look more generic. This can involve the use of dummy
cells to introduce a uniformity to the cell placement. Also, the addition of dummy
cells gives us the option of utilizing more of the available standard cells in a cell
library than just the universal gates.
For C432, while scaling the module in the y-direction changed its size, the cells
were placed in alternate rows, as shown in Figure 6.2c. To fill up all the rows, we
shifted every other cell in each row to the next empty row. We also introduce dummy
cells (NAND gates) with the express purpose of equalizing the number of cells in each
row. Lastly, we spaced the cells in each row equally resulting in a uniform layout,
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as shown in Figure 6.2d. It should be noted that we are not concerned about the
logical proximity of the cells in a design as further steps will target such proximity to
enhance meta-obfuscation achieved.
Such a layout effectively breaks up clustering of cells reducing the attacker’s ability
to form hypotheses as to the nature of such clusters in a larger design. A point to note
is that if the designer does choose to incorporate more cells types, including custom
obfuscated gates, then it becomes imperative to utilize more dummy cells of the new
types to shift focus away from the cells used for the circuit logic. This may incur a
cost in terms of area. Also, hiding structural information becomes a more complex
problem as we have to account for more cell sizes in the layout.
6.4.4 Routing and metal density
Intricately connected to structural regularity is the net routing and metal density
information. To hide the leakage of cell proximity and module boundary information
via the routing of a design, we need to affect the cell placement and its corresponding
routing. The designer needs to be aware that the methods used to increase complexity
in this step will affect the performance of the design, increase the metal resources
needed, and adapt accordingly.
A possible solution is to change the cell positions in a design and increase the
distance between logical neighbors. This will force the place and route tools to utilize
more of the upper metal layers for the new longer connections. Also, the presence
of dummy cells introduced previously affords us the option of controlling their input
and output connections which will affect routing.
A metric is needed to provide a quantifiable measure of quality of meta-obfuscation
for a design. Wire lengths in various metal layers and their density can be considered
a good starting point. However, swapping of cells greatly affects the metal layers
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Figure 6.3: Representation for classification of nets as small, medium and long
used and the lengths of wires in each layer. Hence, for the purpose of driving an
optimization algorithm we consider a different approach.
We divide the design into various grids and classify the nets, i.e. connection
between cells irrespective of metal layers used, as either small, medium or long nets,
as illustrated in Figure 6.3. For each grid, we find the number of these nets present
in the grid or passing through it and classify them into the 3 categories. This results
in a distribution of nets of varying lengths for each grid. Our goal is to increase the
number of long and medium nets for each grid with greater emphasis on longer nets.
Section 6.5 will explore the use of the above metric for C432 circuit in greater




One possible mechanism to hide the clock distribution network is to utilize clock
grid instead of identifiable H-trees. Obfuscation techniques like secret vias [101] would
allow us to hide the locations where the clock in connected to a design. Addition of
dummy flip-flops also can enhance security by confusing attackers while not affecting
the primary circuit. This will be explored in greater detail in the future.
6.5 Methodology for meta-obfuscation
In this section, we detail the various methods considered to improve the meta-
obfuscation of a circuit. We first start with a general description of the proposed
method and then, objective function used to drive the optimization is detailed. Then,
we focus on the various models used for obtaining a solution. As with section 6.4, we
illustrate the results with ISCAS C432 circuit.
6.5.1 Proposed Method
We randomly chose one of the inputs to each dummy cell from the primary and
intermediate nets present in the design and the output of a previously processed
dummy cell as the other input. The first dummy cell’s inputs were assigned using
the primary inputs and the last dummy’s output was turned into a dummy primary
output. This increases the number of pins for the design but, does not affect any of
the valid logic. The relevant files were modified accordingly.
We take the design floorplan from Figure 6.2d and output a Design Exchange
Format (DEF) file. This is modified by the various algorithms discussed below which
select the cells to swap and how many swaps to perform. The new intermediate DEF
file is then forwarded to Encounter for full routing. The final routed design is again
output in DEF format and is processed.
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The designer can choose the number of grids for analysis and their sizes. For our
purpose, we chose 3× 3 grids of equal size. Grid (0, 0) contained the floorplan origin
and (2, 2) was the farthest grid. The nets were classified as explained in section 6.4.4.
The distribution of nets obtained was then used to generate the score, explained
below, which drove the algorithms described subsequently.
All approaches used were only limited by the routing time of Cadence Encounter
tool [1] and not the methods themselves.
6.5.2 Objective function
In section 6.4.4, we chose to divide the design into grids and classify nets into small,
medium and long (Figure 6.3). Using the distribution of such nets in each grid, we
can derive an objective function for use in optimization. The initial distribution of
medium and long nets for each grid for C432 is shown in Figure 6.5a. Our target
is to increase the amount of long and medium nets designated to each grid. It is
entirely possible that an algorithm may end up increasing the number of long nets for
a particular grid while reducing it for another if we just consider maximizing the mean
for all long (µlong) net values across all grids. So, we need to consider the standard
deviation across the grids (σlong) and seek to reduce it. To achieve both an increase
for mean and smallest standard deviation we express the objective as a fraction as





The final score, as given by (6.2), is the sum of the two objectives with long nets
given 70% weight and 30% weight for the medium nets. These values can be changed
depending on the design requirements. Longer nets may degrade performance and
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Figure 6.4: Comparison of performance for Greedy, Simulated Annealing and Genetic
algorithms for varying number of swaps
hence, the designer may choose to give medium nets greater priority. The initial
design is processed and its score is used as a starting point.
Score = 0.7 ∗Objlong + 0.3 ∗Objmedium (6.2)
6.5.3 Greedy algorithm
First, we tried a greedy approach by randomly swapping pairs of cells and checking
the score. The swaps are only accepted if the new score is greater than the previous
maximum. An iteration limit is set to terminate the program and return the final
obtained score.
We set the program limit to 20 iterations and varied the number of swaps per-
formed between 10 → 50. For each case, the experiment was conducted multiple
times and the best improvement obtained over base score was plotted, as shown in
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Figure 6.4. Due to the random nature of the swaps, greedy algorithm is not able
to provide a consistent results. There is no guarantee that increasing the number of
swaps will have any beneficial effect on the solution. Hence, we next try simulated
annealing.
6.5.4 Simulated Annealing
Next, simulated annealing [11] was utilized to study its performance. Initially,
bad results were accepted with a probability of 0.5 reducing acceptance probability
(to 0) as the simulation iteration limit was reached. A quartic function was used
to calculate the probability. Similar to the greedy approach, we plot the results, in
Figure 6.4, for swaps varying between 10→ 50 with a 20 iterations limit. We see that
simulated annealing performed more consistently than greedy algorithm. However,
we observed that increasing the iteration limit made the acceptance probability curve
decline more steeply and negatively affected the results.
6.5.5 Genetic Algorithm
We consider the use of genetic algorithms (GA), a subset of evolutionary algo-
rithms (EA). They imitate natural evolution utilizing analogous concepts like muta-
tion, reproduction, crossover and selection. The genetic algorithm produces a popu-
lation of candidates for whom a score/fitness is calculated and children are selected
for the next generation based on some internal heuristics. We make use of the open-
source toolkit, Pyevolve [8] to implement the genetic algorithm.
Initially, we set a population size of 20 and observe the best candidate for a
single generation while varying the number of swaps between 10→ 50, similar to the
previous approaches. The objective function that calculates the fitness is the same
as before, given by (6.2). The results for medium and long nets, from Figure 6.4
show that, GA performs quite well and gives significant improvement over greedy
and simulated annealing approaches.
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(a) Grid Metrics before optimization
(b) Grid Metrics after optimization
Figure 6.5: Genetic Algorithm Results ISCAS C432 [53]
We reset the population size to the default, 80 in Pyevolve, and increased the
number of generations to 10. This gave us an improvement of 87.5% in the metric.
We plot the number of small, medium and long nets in each grid of the design before
and after applying the genetic algorithm in Figure 6.5. The results show an increase
in the medium and long nets while also keeping the variation across the grids low.
The initial and final floorplans with dummies (red) and select net (blue) highlighted
for comparison is shown in Figure 6.6. This shows that some shorter nets become
long during optimization and improve the score. Also, the metal lines in metal layer
M3 have been plotted in Figure 6.7 before and after optimization. We see that the
metal lines are more spread out after processing compared to the original.
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(a) Floorplan before optimization (b) Floorplan after optimization
Figure 6.6: Genetic Algorithm Results for ISCAS C432 [53]
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(a) M3 before optimization (b) M3 after optimization
Figure 6.7: Comparison of metal lines in M3 layer for ISCAS C432 [53]
6.6 Conclusion
Obfuscation techniques have been proposed to counter reverse engineering with an
intent to steal IP from legal parties by malicious actors. However, the physical layout
of a design can still leak visual information. In this work, we explore the various
ways in which such information can be leaked and provide mechanisms, termed as
meta-obfuscation, to address them. We also discuss a metric that can be used to
quantify the quality of meta-obfuscation. A methodology to maximize the metric is
also discussed. The results show that a significant improvement can be achieved via
the use of evolutionary algorithms.
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CHAPTER 7
ON LEVERAGING MULTI-THRESHOLD FINFETS FOR
DESIGN OBFUSCATION
7.1 Introduction
Robust hardware obfuscation, on a circuit-level, can be achieved by leveraging
the intrinsic characteristics, such as threshold voltage, of transistors instead of just
relying on physical structures for creating camouflaged gates. Such characteristics
are not susceptible to imaging techniques and analyzing the chemical composition of
individual transistors in advanced nodes is exceedingly difficult as the characteristic
is determined by just a few hundred doping atoms. Specifically, we leverage the large
number of threshold voltages supported by FinFETs, which have been conventionally
targeted towards enabling increased optimization for power and performance [2]. For
example, commercial FinFET process development kits (PDKs) from TSMC offer four
transistor threshold options in 16 nm technology node [12]. In contrast, MOSFETs
could support one or two threshold voltages. Furthermore, FinFETs permit larger
transistor stacking height in a cell design [3] and hence, can support greater number
of inputs and hence, implement more functions efficiently compared to MOSFETs.
In this chapter, we propose a simple n-input gate design that utilizes 4 thresh-
old voltage transistor options available from a commercial vendor’s 16 nm process
development kit (PDK). We analyze 2-, 3- and 4- input variants of the design and
show that it is possible to implement a large number of functions using the same
structure and different threshold voltage assignments. Our designs are shown to be
stable across different process, voltage and temperature (PVT) ranges. Further, we
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explore SAT-based attacks [77] that can reverse engineer the functionality of a circuit
by observing the outputs during operation and possessing basic layout details, such
as the number of gates and interconnection information. Our designs are shown to
increase the effort required to de-obfuscate the circuit by an order of magnitude com-
pared to designs synthesized with commercial cell libraries for ISCAS-85 benchmarks
[53]. Lastly, we explore certain special functions whose outputs are only dependent
on the state of a subset of the inputs and study the effect of their incorporation on
de-obfuscation.
7.2 Background
Previously, we briefly explored obfuscation techniques that have been proposed in
previous research at various levels of design abstraction in Section 6.2. In this section,
we further explore previous research on circuit-level obfuscation techniques and also,
discuss works on reverse engineering obfuscated designs, with focus on SAT-based
attacks.
7.2.1 Hardware Obfuscation
Circuit-level obfuscation techniques involve creation/modification of cell designs
with the goal of hiding the true functionality of the camouflaged gate. Rajendran
et al.[101] have proposed a cell design that can implement a variety of Boolean func-
tions by utilizing programmable dummy contacts. However, their design realizes a
limited number of functions while incurring large area and power overheads ( 4−5×).
While previous techniques require layout modifications to achieve their goal, it is
possible to use the intrinsic properties of transistors to realize hardware obfuscation.
Transistor doping-based camouflaging was explored by Malik et al.[84] to create an
obfuscated cell. Multiple such cells are combined to obtain obfuscated gates. Thresh-
old voltage-based camouflaging techniques include leveraging pass transistors [34,60]
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or employing sense amplifier-based (SABL) logic and changing the threshold of tran-
sistors post-fabrication [15]. These techniques also do not realize a large array of
functions with SABL logic-based technique incurring even greater overheads (> 6×).
7.2.2 Reverse Engineering Attacks
Extensive surveys of state-of-the-art hardware reverse engineering techniques at
varying levels of attacker capabilities have been conducted [43, 99]. In this work, we
assume that the attacker is capable of extracting most layout information and so, we
focus on SAT-based attacks.
Many of the previously proposed obfuscation techniques are susceptible to SAT
solver-based attacks where the attacker is capable of querying the IP and obtaining
its outputs for a set of given inputs. The camouflaged gates can be represented as ab-
stractions, such as a MUX or switch network with programming inputs, and the SAT
algorithms utilized to guess the function of camouflaged gates by finding the program-
ming inputs [131,132]. In this work, we utilize the SAT-based de-obfuscation scheme
proposed by Yu et al.[132] as it is shown to perform significantly better compared to
other SAT approaches.
7.3 Multi-threshold FinFET Camouflaged Cell
In this section, we first describe the basic design of the FinFET camouflaged cell
and analyze the performance of the camouflaged cells under environmental variations.
Next, we explore the requirements to realize an exclusive-or function with our design.
Lastly, we create a custom cell library and synthesize various ISCAS-85 benchmark
circuits and compare them against the same circuits synthesized using a commercial
cell library.
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Figure 7.1: General structure of Multi-Vt FinFET camouflaged cell
7.3.1 Basic Cell Design
Our design goal was to be able to realize as many functions as possible for an
n-input gate without changing its physical structure. Ideally, 22
n
logic functions are
possible with an n-input gate design. Additionally, we sought a scalable cell design
that could implement an n + 1-input gate with simple, limited modification to an
n-input gate. Towards achieving these ends, we propose the cell design as shown in
Figure 7.1.
The n-type FinFET pull-down network (PDN), in Figure 7.1, consists of tran-
sistors (Mnx) comprising two stacks of height n. Therefore, the total number of
transistors in the PDN is 2n. For example, a 2-input cell will have 4 transis-
tors ({Mn0 . . .Mn3}) in the PDN with Mn2 and Mn3 connected to ground. The
source/drain nodes of any two transistors at the same level, like {Mn0,Mn1} or
{Mn2,Mn3}, in each stack are shorted. The inputs to one stack are the original gate in-
puts ({a, b, . . . }) while the other stack receives the complimented inputs ({a, b, . . . }).
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As can be seen from Figure 7.1, such a ladder structure allows all possible paths be-
tween the output node, out, and the ground for various input combinations. The
pull-up network consists of a p-type FinFET, Mp, connected to an enable input, EN.
An inverter at the output of the PDN is used to restore the signal voltage levels and
generate the final gate output, Y.
When EN is logic-1, the circuit is gated and saves power. Switching EN to logic-0
allows the current to flow into the PDN network. Based on the threshold voltage
(Vt) parameters of the transistors, certain paths to the ground will be dominant. The
PDN circuit acts as a voltage-controlled resistive divider. Combined with the input
signal combinations to the cell, we can realize different functions. To implement
various logic functions, we permutate through the available threshold voltage options
for the PDN transistors and all possible 2n input combinations and perform SPICE
simulations to generate the truth tables for each set of transistor permutations. The
transistors sizes, in terms of the number of fins (nFin), are chosen accordingly. We
note that multiple sets of PDN transistor Vt assignments may implement the same
logic function. This provides us flexibility in selecting the most stable assignment
after analyzing the effect of environmental variations.
In our work, we consider a commercial 16 nm PDK that supports 4 threshold
voltage options, having a nominal voltage of 0.8 V and analyze 2-, 3- and 4-input
gate designs. The available threshold voltage options will be designated as ulvt, lvt,
svt (standard) and hvt in increasing order of threshold voltage, respectively. For an
n-input cell, the total number of possible multi-threshold assignments and hence, the
number of SPICE circuits analyzed is 42n. This gives us 256, 4096 and 65536 distinct
circuits to analyze for 2-, 3- and 4-input gates, respectively. The p-type FinFET,
Mp, has width, nFin = 2. For the 2-input and 3-input cells, the PDN transistors
have a width of nFin = 3, while the 4-input PDN transistors are sized nFin = 4.
In the physical layout, we note that each transistor with a different threshold voltage
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Table 7.1: Number of Stable Logic Functions for Camouflaged gate with varying
fan-in
Fan-in (n)





requires a minimum area, while two transistors of the same threshold voltage type
could share the same area. For our gate area calculations, we assume each transistor
assignment is different to get the upper bound.
We note that a second inverter can be used to generate the compliment, Y , using
the input Y. This allows us to generate both the necessary input signals needed by
any subsequent fan-out gate for the current cell’s output. An added advantage is the
reduction in the total cell size. For example, a 4-input camouflaged cell would need
to include 4 inverters to generate the complementary signals for all its inputs if the
previous fan-in camouflaged cells did not generate a pair of signals, adding significant
area overhead. Only the primary inputs (PIs) to the netlist would need an explicit
set of inverters to generate their complements. However, this approach does increase
the routing density for the entire design.
7.3.1.1 Environmental variations
Given the usage of transistors with differing threshold voltages, it is critical to
ensure that the particular transistor permutation selected to implement a function
is stable in the presence of supply voltage noise and temperature variations. Due to
the undoped channel in a FinFET, its threshold voltage is not susceptible to Random
Dopant Fluctuations (RDF) like conventional MOSFETs. However, irregularities in
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the fin surface introduced due to manufacturing process variation can have an impact
in the form of metal-gate work function variation (WFV) [86]. Hence, we need to
consider the effect of process variations while making the final selection of threshold
voltage assignments.
First, we seek to find the maximum number of unique logic functions that can be
realized in the presence of supply voltage variations. Towards this end, we analyze
each design with a specific set of PDN transistor Vt assignments for supply voltage
variations of nominal± 10%. The nominal voltage is set at 0.8 V for the commercial
16 nm PDK used in this work. Synopsys HSPICE was used for all simulations. Ta-
ble 7.1 lists the number of observed stable logic functions across all supply voltages
and the total possible logic functions for 2-, 3- and 4-input camouflaged gate designs.
Since a logic function may be realized with more than one set of PDN Vt assignments
and some assignments may change the circuit behavior under supply voltage noise,
we need to ensure that we record only the assignments that result in a stable output
function.
Once we obtain a database of possible output functions for an n-input gate and
the corresponding PDN Vt assignments, we run further simulations on these designs
only. We analyzed their performance across a temperature range of 273 K to 373 K
and applied the PDK vendor recommended process variations. For process variations,
1000 Monte Carlo simulations were performed for each design and we check which
PDN assignments were able to maintain their functionality the most. This further
whittles down the number of PDN Vt assignment sets for a given output function.
Hence, we see that the total number of unique functions reduces significantly as n
increases, as indicated in Table 7.1.
In Table 7.2, we compare the area, delay and power performance of 2-, 3- and
4-input NAND gates implemented using complimentary logic and our camouflaged
design. For area and delay, our camouflaged version of the NAND gate see a maximum
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Table 7.2: Comparison of Area, Delay and Power characteristics between Regular
(Reg) and Camouflaged (Camo) NAND cells
NAND2 NAND3 NAND4
Reg Camo Reg Camo Reg Camo
Area
(µm2)
0.17 0.35 0.22 0.5 0.28 0.65
Delay
(ps)
6.10 15.56 8.39 24.62 11.83 26.78
Power
(µW)
294.7 69.55 391.77 69.30 482.98 69.31
overhead of 2.32× and 2.93×, respectively. However, with regards to power, we see a
minimum reduction of 4.24×. Furthermore, all n-input camouflaged gates consumed
similar amounts of power. This is due to the fact that our circuit does not see a
full-rail voltage swing due to the fact that p-type FinFET, Mp, is active when the
PDN evaluates the output. Hence, there is a reduction in the power consumed at
the expense of reduction in the output noise margin at node out, with the minimum
noise margin observed being 200 mV. However, the output inverter ensures that the
voltages are restored at node Y.
7.3.1.2 Implementing XOR/XNOR with via manipulation
We note that our camouflaged cells are not able to realize XOR/XNOR logic func-
tions for any n-input gate considered. This is due to the shorting of the internal nodes
to create the ladder structure, as shown in Figure 7.1. For implementing a regular
2-input XOR/XNOR function, there needs to be an exclusive path to the ground
only when both inputs are the same (XOR) or both are complementary (XNOR).
This is not possible with our camouflaged structure. Furthermore, for gates with
n > 2 inputs, the XOR/XNOR functions are even more complex and cannot be
implemented.
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One possible method to implement XNOR function for 2-input camouflaged cell
by disconnecting the drain nodes Mn2 and Mn3 in the PDN shown in Figure 7.1
via manipulation techniques to introduce dummy via contacts in the physical layout
to make it appear as if a connection exists [101, 127]. Furthermore, we can utilize
dummy vias and create a layout that can implement the XOR function. We can route
the nets from an input (say b) to both the transistors (Mn2, Mn3). We can add a
legitimate via between the input and the desired gate (Mn2) and adding a dummy via
for the other gate (Mn3). Repeating the same for the complementary input (b) we can
confuse an attacker and increase reverse-engineering effort. However, such a layout
modification would need to be made for all the 2-input gate functions implemented
to prevent differentiation between XOR and other gates. Hence, XNOR may be
easier to implement in practical use. If such techniques are available, then we only
need to use svt option for the PDN transistors {Mn0 . . .Mn3} to achieve XOR/XNOR
functionality.
7.3.2 Camouflaged Cell Library
We perused the stable logic functions for 2-, 3- and 4-input camouflaged gates
and constructed a camouflaged cell library with a total of 62 logic gates. We included
a basic inverter to allow proper design synthesis and assume that we have 2-input
XOR/XNOR available, using modifications described in Section 7.3.1.2. We selected
one cell design with a particular PDN Vt assignment set for each logic function. The
selection process was driven with the aim of matching as many available functions as
possible in a commercial 16 nm standard cell library. We note that our cell library
is not exhaustive with respect to possible 3- and 4-input logic functions and other
designers may choose to implement an even larger cell library, including more than
one cell design for a logic function.
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c17 3 0.88 4 1.7 92.15
c432 88 20.68 78 37.2 79.88
c499 154 54.19 178 62.7 15.70
c1908 176 55.52 191 75.7 36.35
c2670 354 90.52 471 149.2 64.83
c3540 454 124.58 551 239.8 92.48
c6288 1492 356.60 1505 660.6 85.25
c7552 768 242.64 999 387.6 59.74
We compare our camouflaged cell library and the commercial cell library by syn-
thesizing a set of ISCAS-85 [53] benchmark circuits using Synopsys Design Compiler.
It should be noted that in practical scenarios, a designer may choose to camouflage
only part of the design and hence, the area overhead will be much lower. Table 7.3
lists the number of gates in the synthesized netlist for each cell library and the area
estimates. The area overhead depends on the logic functions utilized in a particular
benchmark circuit. However, our camouflaged netlist is generally larger due to the
basic 2- and 3-input cells being larger than the standard cell versions, while 4-input
function cells were comparable in size. Also, there is no variation in size among cam-
ouflaged cells with a particular number of inputs due to the common physical layout
while the standard cell library would have different areas. Lastly, certain functions
were not available for the camouflaged cell library due to their instability in the pres-
ence environmental variations. Also, the unavailability of XOR/XNOR functionality
for gates with more than 2 inputs adversely affects the netlist area.
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7.4 SAT Solver based De-obfuscation
In this section, we explore the resilience of our camouflaged cell design against
SAT solver attacks. We, first, describe the capabilities of an attacker seeking to
reverse engineer our design. Then, we compare the performance of our camouflaging
against utilizing a limited gate camouflaging technique [101] with respect to the de-
obfuscation time for ISCAS-85 benchmark circuits. Lastly, our camouflaged cells can
realize certain functions where the output is decided by only a subset of the inputs
while the rest of the inputs can be considered as dummies. We explore the utilization
of such cells in a design and their effect on de-obfuscation performance.
7.4.1 Attacker Capabilities
Due to the chip manufacturer (foundry) having perfect information about the
layout, we assume the manufacturer is a trusted vendor. Our attacker is a third-party
who wishes to reverse engineer our protected IP and is able to obtain multiple chips
containing our design. The attacker is capable of reverse-engineering the layout of the
IP using imaging and de-layering techniques and extract basic physical information
such as the number of primary inputs/outputs, gates and their interconnections. The
attacker can identify non-camouflaged gates readily. The attacker can differentiate
between different sized camouflaged gates and can easily identify inverters. However,
we make the assumption that the attacker cannot distinguish between legitimate and
dummy vias. Also, the attacker does not have information about the logic functions
implemented in our camouflaged cell library. The attacker is also able to query our
IP block without restrictions and obtain the outputs for usage in the Oracle-guided
Incremental SAT solver technique [132].
7.4.2 SAT Attack
The main advantage of our proposed camouflaging is the large number of possible
logic functions that can be realized with the same physical layout for a given n-
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Figure 7.2: General structure of Multi-Vt FinFET camouflaged cell for SAT Solver
[132]
input gate. To illustrate the increased de-obfuscation effort, we compare against a
camouflaging technique with a cell design implements a limited set of functions like
NAND/NOR/XOR [101].
An attacker using the powerful Oracle-guided SAT based de-obfuscation scheme
[132] can model an n-input camouflaged cell as a 2n : 1 Mux with n select inputs, as
shown in Figure 7.2. The programming vector bits, {p0, p1, . . . , p2n−1} are utilized by
the SAT solver to guess the output functions based on querying the circuit multiple
times and making observations about the internal functionality. For example, solving
a 2-input NAND gate with inputs {AB} taking the values {00, 01, 10, 11} would
output {p0, p1, p2, p3} = {1, 1, 1, 0}. For the limited NAND/NOR/XOR scheme, the
attacker would have to guess only 3 sets of values to distinguish between the possible
gates. There is no increased effort when using camouflaged gate with greater number
of inputs as this information is readily available in the layout and the number of logic
functions implemented is still the same. However, since our camouflaged cell design
can implement a large array of functions (22
n
possible), the SAT solver would have
to consider all possible combinations for the programming vector bits.
For the limited camouflaging technique, we synthesized the ISCAS-85 benchmark
circuits using the commercial 16 nm standard cell library while allowing the design
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to only utilize 2-, 3- and 4-input versions of NAND, NOR and XOR gates. The total
number of gates in the final netlist is tabulated in Table 7.4 and is noted to be greater
than the number of gates needed by our camouflage technique (listed in Table 7.3).
However, the maximum increase in the number of gates is less than 24%.
To obtain the de-obfuscation effort for both techniques, we assume that 25% of
the gates in a the synthesized netlist are obfuscated to the attacker and need to
be solved for using SAT. We select the gates to be camouflaged randomly and for
each benchmark circuit/camouflaging technique, 10 iterations are performed with a
specified Timeout of 24 hours (86400 s). Such a scenario can be considered practical,
as a designer may only choose to obfuscate part of the IP to keep the area overhead
to a minimum.
Table 7.4 lists the highest de-obfuscation time observed for each benchmark circuit
and camouflaging technique. The results indicate a minimum of 10× increase in the
de-obfuscation effort for the attacker when using our camouflaged cells with 2 orders
of magnitude increase being more likely.
7.4.3 Dummy-input Gates
Among the available logic functions from our camouflaged cells, there are certain
functions whose output is determined only by a subset of inputs. For example, in a
function Y = a · (b+ b), the input b is redundant and can be considered as a dummy
input while the function implements a buffer for a. For gates with n > 2 inputs, more
complex functions with more redundant inputs can exist.
For our work, we explore the effect of leveraging such functions to further increase
the reverse-engineering effort for SAT attacks. Specifically, we will consider a 2-input
buffer with one dummy input and 3-input buffer with two dummies. This allows us
to add such gates anywhere in the design without changing the functionality of the
downstream logic. Once inserted, we can connect a dummy input to an arbitrary
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Table 7.4: De-obfuscation effort for limited and Multi-Vt FinFET Camouflaging with










c432 120 53 14088
c499 150 41 30169
c1908 225 201 [Timeout]
c2670 536 2990 33843
c3540 749 259 12385
c7552 1233 1376 [Timeout]
output generated in a previous logic level or to a primary input. This prevents the
possibility of creating logic loops.
We chose to analyze 3 designs - c432, c499 and 2670. We consider the full design
to be de-obfuscated and only add the camouflaged dummy-input gates. This allows
us to only observe the effect of adding such gates. We perform the gate insertion
in stages to find the minimum number of dummy-input gates that can provide the
maximum increase in SAT attack effort. The number of dummy-input gates added
in each subsequent stage increases by 5% of the total number of gates in the original
netlist and we choose either the 2- or 3-input version with equal probability. We
generate 10 netlists with randomly inserted dummy-input gates and run the SAT
attack for each netlist with a timeout of 24 hours.
From the results in Table 7.5, we can see that it is possible to significantly increase
the reverse-engineering effort by multiple orders of magnitude with just inserting
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dummy-input gates in a design. In practical usage, such gates would be included in
the cell library and the dummy connections would be made after design synthesis.
7.5 Conclusion
Hardware obfuscation is a promising approach for protecting intellectual property
against reverse engineering attacks. In this chapter, we proposed an n-input circuit
design that can realize a vast number of unique output functions just by changing
the threshold voltage options used for certain FinFET transistors, while keeping the
physical layout the same. We compared our camouflaged gates to regular gate de-
signs and while our designs due incur an overhead in terms of area and delay, they
performed better in terms of power. However, we show that the structurally identical
camouflaged cells are able to increase the reverse engineering effort by an order of
magnitude for a SAT-based attack. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the reverse
engineering effort can further be increased by utilizing dummy-input gates which do




Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have shown promise as lightweight hard-
ware security primitives with various applications ranging from key-generation and
authentication to IP protection. The salient properties of PUFs are – Uniqueness,
Reliability and Unpredictability/Security. Hence, improving these core properties of
PUFs is essential for their deployment in practical applications. The first half of this
dissertation focused on solutions to improve reliability and unpredictability of PUFs.
Weak PUFs have been primarily utilized for cryptographic key generation appli-
cations and thus, are required to have very high reliability (¡ 1 failure in 106 key
generations). Typically, Weak PUF bits undergo post-processing to generate error-
free keys. However, such an approach can incur significant area and power overheads,
reducing viability for usage in resource-constrained environments. In this disserta-
tion, we explored new circuit designs to better harness inherent process variations
to create a more robust Weak PUF bit. This reduces the post-processing resources
needed to generate highly reliable keys. Furthermore, we proposed an intelligent
burn-in/accelerated aging system to further improve the reliability of the Weak PUF
cells. Our system provides relevant feedback, in an automated fashion, to allow man-
ufacturers to reduce the burn-in time required and hence, increase manufacturing
throughput.
Strong PUFs can provide a low cost alternative to cryptography-based authentica-
tion. However, unreliability in Strong PUFs can increase the cost of proper authenti-
cation and low resistance against model building attacks using machine learning tech-
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niques creates a security risk. In this dissertation, we address the problem of machine
learning resistance by proposing new Strong PUF architectures utilizing WiSARD,
a simple Weightless Neural Network (WNN) model. Furthermore, the WNN Strong
PUF architectures were extended to utilize a reliable Weak PUF entropy source to
realize a robust Strong PUF. The concept of utilizing reliable entropy source was
further explored to generate Strong PUF system based on pattern-matching schemes
that compare the Weak PUF bits and states of a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR)
to generate robust and secure keys. All of our proposed Strong PUF designs are
lightweight and hence, can be incorporated into a large array of devices with varying
resource constraints. Further research includes fine-tuning the proposed designs for
fabrication and testing for real-world applications.
Obfuscation techniques have been proposed, at various levels of design abstraction,
to counter reverse engineering with an intent to steal IP from legal parties by malicious
actors. In this dissertation, we focused on system-level meta-obfuscation techniques
to prevent information leakage from the physical layout and developed metrics to
measure the quality of obfuscation. Our methodology maximized the obfuscation
metrics utilizing evolutionary algorithms. This dissertation also explored circuit-
level obfuscation by leveraging multi-threshold FinFETs to create n-input circuit
design that can realize a vast number of unique output functions by just changing
the assigned FinFET, without any changes in physical layout. These camouflaged
gates were compared against regular gate designs in terms of area, power and latency
overheads and performed favorably. Furthermore, their resilience against reverse-
engineering attacks were demonstrated utilizing standard benchmark circuits.
With Internet-of-Things (IoTs) being touted as a major future technology revo-
lution, securing these systems against various forms of attack is of paramount im-
portance. Low cost security solutions will be of great necessity to fully realize the
potential of IoTs. PUFs show promise in implementing lightweight security features
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and the solutions proposed in this dissertation will make them viable for widespread
deployment. Also, intellectual property theft is a universal problem and this disser-
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